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A PRAGMATIC MODEL OF LAW
Daniel C.K. Chow*
While all of us are pragmatic in an informal or colloquial sense in many instances in
daily life, pragmatism as applied to law has a deeper, jurisprudential sense The author
suggests that modern legal pragmatism presents a model of law that avoids the serious philo-
sophical errors of the traditional model of law, which is based upon assumptions that are
untenable in light of fundamental developments in twentieth century thought The tradi-
tional modeljustifies law by grounding law in eternal, immutable and transcendental foun-
dations. All modern legal pragmatists reject the notion that transcendental foundations
sustain law.
Modern legal pragmatism arose in two stages. The first, largely negative phase, critical
pragmatism, rejected foundationalism, thereby undermining the very legitimacy of law
under the traditional modeL Eventually, a second strand of legal pragmatism, prudential-
ism, emerged to construct an alternative model of law. The prudentialists attempt to restore
legitimacy to law by appealing to tradition rather than to foundations.
To a large extent, modern legal thought has finally reached the stage where most scholars
and jurists now share common basic assumptions about the nature of legal knowledge and
normative theory. Pragmatism thus potentially signals a new stage for modern legal
thought At the same time, however, legal pragmatism also contains some ominous prospects
of a return to a sometimes oppressive past. Combining elements from both camps of prag-
matism, the author then charts a middle course that attempts to accommodate the pruden-
tialists' respect for tradition and the critical pragmatists' emphasis on diversity and
pluralism.
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INTRODUCTION
All of us have at times submitted to the urge to be pragmatic, to cast
aside reflection and do whatever works to achieve some immediate
objective. No doubt there are many instances in daily life when it is
unobjectionable or even appropriate for anyone, including lawyers, to
act pragmatically in this informal, colloquial sense. Some commenta-
tors seem to harbor the lurking suspicion that legal pragmatism, a
jurisprudence that seems now to include virtually all scholars and
jurists,' may be no more than this approach as applied to law.'
If legal pragmatism were merely an ad hoc, result-oriented
approach to law, then from a jurisprudential point of view, it would be
at best trivial and incomplete, and at worst, dangerous and alarming.3
1. See, eg., Thomas C. Grey, Hear the Other Side: Wallace Stevens and Pragmatist Legal
Theory, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569, 1590 (1990) ("[P]ragmatism is the implicit working theory of
most good lawyers."); see also Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 787 (1989) [hereinafter Holmes and Legal Pragmatism]. The inescapable conclusion seems
to be that "we are all pragmatists now." Joseph W. Singer, Should Lawyers Care About
Philosophy?, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1752, 1753. Even Professor Ronald Dworkin, who has flatly
rejected pragmatism and even "bad-mouths" it, see Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism
and the Poetry of Justice, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1811, 1811 (1990), has recently been recast as a
pragmatist himself. See Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 411
(1990).
2. Thus, Judge Richard Posner writes that pragmatism is:
a grab bag of methods, both of investigation and of persuasion. It includes anecdote,
introspection, imagination, common sense, intuition .... empathy, imputation of motives,
speaker's authority, metaphor, analogy, precedent, custom, memory, "induction" (the
expectation of regularities, related both to intuition and to analogy), [and] "experience."
Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MicH. L. REV. 827, 838 (1988); see also
Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L.
REV. 1615, 1646 (1987) (pragmatism denotes "an overall humility" to legal theory); Smith, supra
note 1, at 411 (pragmatism is an attitude, an "exhortation about theorizing").
Others, such as Ronald Dworkin, have been accused of reducing pragmatism to a "crass
instrumentalism," that attenuates pragmatism to an endorsement of whatever works to achieve a
particular purpose, the simplistic and unacceptable view that the ends justify the means. See
Margaret J. Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1722 (1990). For
views describing the current disarray in pragmatism and jurisprudence generally, see P. John
Kozyris, In the Cauldron: The View From Within the Stew (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Washington Law Review).
3. Some suggest that legal pragmatism is essentially trivial. See, eg., Richard A. Posner,
What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1653, 1653 (1990) ("[T1he great
weakness of Pragmatism is that it ends by being of no use to anybody."); Rorty, supra note 1, at
1811 (pragmatism is "[essentially] banal in its application to law"); Smith, supra note 1, at 424
("[I]f everyone is... a pragmatist, then it seems that pragmatism is not a distinct legal theory at
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After all, law involves fundamental normative questions of power and
coercion. Where there is law, human conduct is made in some sense
nonoptional or obligatory.' Courts deprive people on a basis of prop-
erty, liberty, and even life, all because they have broken some law or
violated someone's legal rights. We need to justify the political and
moral obligation to obey law in a way that distinguishes the legitimate
coercion of the law from tyranny or arbitrary power.5
A conception of legal pragmatism as either a judge's nonrational
intuition about the appropriateness of a judicial outcome or a judge's
sense that the outcome would advance a favored objective is inade-
quate because it fails to distinguish law from arbitrary power. Any
satisfactory account of law must explain why a legal outcome embod-
ies more than the personal preferences of the legal decisionmaker. If
legal pragmatism is indeed a significant new development in jurispru-
dence rather than a platitudinous label, then it must be more than
simply a nonreflective, crassly instrumentalist approach to law.
In this Article, I explore a deeper, jurisprudential version of legal
pragmatism. Under traditional legal thought, a dominant, orthodox
model of law accounted for the legitimacy of legal obligation and legal
reasoning. This model of law is grounded on the bedrock of two dis-
tinct features of philosophical foundationalism: a foundationalist
ontology to justify legal obligation and a foundationalist epistemology
to drive legal reasoning and argumentation. I argue that legal pragma-
tism offers an alternative model of law that avoids the significant phil-
osophical errors of the traditional model. That model embodied by
the natural law and legal positivist theories was based upon assump-
tions that are no longer tenable in light of fundamental developments
in twentieth century intellectual thought. I suggest that legal pragma-
tism offers both a better descriptive account of legal reasoning as well
as a better normative account of legal obligation.
Part I of this Article sets forth the main features of the traditional
model of law. Parts II and III of the Article then set forth the first of
two stages in the rise of legal pragmatism. This first stage, critical
pragmatism, was largely negative in character and impact. Relying on
all."); Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, supra note 1, at 814 ("[Pragmatism] concludes in
truisms.").
4. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 80 (1961); see also RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 15 (1977); JOSEPH RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW ESSAYS: ON
LAW AND MORALITY 33 (1979).
5. See DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 13-16 (concepts of law and legal obligation support
society's warrant to punish and coerce); see also RICHARD A. POSrIER, THE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE 9 (1992) (equating naked power with lawlessness as opposed to the legitimate
normative authority of law).
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developments in twentieth century philosophy, critical pragmatists
urged the rejection of both foundationalist features of the traditional
model of law.
Taking an extreme position, the arguments of some critical
pragmatists, the critical legal scholars, challenge the legitimacy of the
traditional model in two ways and raise the specter of anarchism and
nihilism.6 Part II addresses their rejection of ontological foundation-
alism, which seems to leave us with no normative basis to justify law
or to distinguish legal coercion from arbitrary power. Part III
addresses their rejection of epistemological foundationalism, which
seems to entail the serious erosion of determinacy in legal reasoning.7
If law is as radically indeterminate as these scholars proclaim, then
laws do not bind judges and judges do not follow the law, but always
create it. If judges act arbitrarily and enforce their own will, then law
becomes tyranny.
Parts IV turns to the second phase of pragmatism, prudentialism,
which begins the reconstruction of an alternative model of law in a
post-foundationalist world. Legal pragmatists offer both a normative
account of law and an account of determinacy in legal reasoning, but
without an appeal to foundations. Drawing upon the works of classi-
cal and modern philosophers, the prudentialists construct a cautious,
conservative 8 respect for tradition and inherited culture to restore
determinacy in legal reasoning and textual interpretation.'
Part V explores the critical and prudential pragmatists' normative
account of law. Using a pragmatic, deontological approach, legal
pragmatists explain the basis of the political and moral obligation to
6. See, e.g., Daniel C.K. Chow, Trashing Nihilism, 65 TUL. L. REv. 221 (1990) (discussing
the extreme positions of some critical legal scholars); Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the
Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE LJ. 1 (1984); see also infra text accompanying notes
51-54.
7. For a fuller discussion of this point, see infra text accompanying notes 110-20.
8. By "conservative," I refer to an epistemological feature of prudentialism. For the purposes
of this Article, I do not mean to suggest that prudentialists are affiliated with any political party,
currently elected politicians, or any known political agendas. While I believe that prudentialism
has flaws, one type of argument that I do not consider in this Article is whether the prudentialists
are being less than candid and seek to advance hidden political objectives in the guise of legal
theory. Cf Stephen F. Ross, Reaganist Realism Comes to Detroit, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 399,
420-33 (suggesting that some prudentialists have a hidden substantive agenda). To be sure, a
conservative theory of legal knowledge has political consequences for our society. To be
epistemologically conservative means to consider coherence with an existing web of legal
knowledge to be the test of legal knowledge. What counts as a valid legal argument tends to be
that which most fully coheres with the existing body of legal doctrine and with existing legal
institutions. For a legal system, preservation of existing legal institutions becomes a virtue. See
infra text accompanying notes 141-44.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 165-77, 184-88.
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obey law without ontological foundations. When we examine norma-
tive theory, it becomes clear that what ultimately divides the critical
and prudential pragmatists are the conflicting norms favored by each
camp. An examination of pragmatic normative theory also exposes
some deeply ominous prospects. Some prudentialists, ensconced in
positions of high authority and power, appear to seek a return to a
sometimes callous past that was often insensitive to certain dis-
empowered and disadvantaged groups. I suggest al approach to prag-
matic normative theory that steers a middle course and combines key
elements of both prudential and critical pragmatism. This approach
may stem the rising prudentialist tide so that the promise of a new
stage for modem legal thought does not become a dark regression to
an unenlightened past.
I. THE TRADITIONAL MODEL OF LAW
The traditional model of law contains both a normative theory
explaining the political and moral obligation to obey law and an
account of legal reasoning. Law is legitimate if the axioms or suprale-
gal norms underlying law are true, if the logical tools of legal reason-
ing and textual interpretation are valid, and if the tools are correctly
applied. By "legitimate," I refer to the classical liberal concept that
when a law is legitimate, we owe a political allegiance to that law and
have a prima facie moral obligation to follow it.'0
A. Ontological Foundations
The traditional model invokes extralegal or suprapolitical axioms or
norms to justify legal obligation and to distinguish law from arbitrary
power.11 These norms are found in an immanent normative order
embedded within the ontological structure of the universe itself. 2
10. See John Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 3
(Sidney Hook ed., 1964) ("[T]here is, at least in a society such as ours, a moral obligation to obey
the law, although it may, of course, be overridden in certain cases by other more stringent
obligations."). As used here "liberal" does not refer to any existing political parties or known
politicians, but instead refers to a political philosophy that emphasizes the moral authority of
individual autonomy. This view is associated with Locke, Hume, Mill, and recently John Rawls
and Robert Nozick. See also infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
11. See POSNER, supra note 5, at 5 ("Even the simplest society has norms, tacit or explicit,
that evolve from the needs of the society before there are judges or other officials.... [N]orms
precede formal legal systems.").
12. See LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 42 (1987); see also EDWARD A.
PURCELL JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE
PROBLEM OF VALUE 3-12 (1973) (discussing the rationalistic belief that there exist certain
immutable metaphysical principles that explain the true nature of reality and that form the basis
of the ethically good).
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These extralegal norms, part of the structure of reality itself, legitimate
or supply the binding authority of positive law-laws promulgated by
legislatures, courts and other governmental bodies.' 3 This view of law
requires a theory that identifies the extralegal norms that drive the
engine of law. Two traditional theories have emerged: natural law and
legal positivism.
L Natural Law
Under the theory of natural law, extralegal norms consisted of a
natural set of comprehensive directives for human conduct. 4 To the
extent that positive law reflected this natural law, positive law was
legitimate and thereby imposed upon human subjects a prima facie
moral obligation of obedience.
Natural law represented a realm of higher law, a transcendental,
ontological foundation for concepts of individual autonomy and moral
freedom in the eighteenth century, elaborated by Immanuel Kant 5
and later developed by Locke, Mill, and Bentham, among others. In
the Descartes-Kant-Locke tradition, this higher law provided the
moral foundations for the liberal democracy embedded in the United
States Constitution,' 6 and would ultimately trump a countervailing
13. See POSNER, supra note 5, at 5.
14. See WEINREB, supra note 12, at 61.
15. During the eighteenth century, the ruling scientific framework was Newtonian
determinism, which posited a completely deterministic universe, set within a framework of
absolute time and space, like a great clock set in motion by God at the beginning of time and left
undisturbed. See STEPHEN W. HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 53 (1988); see also J.
BRONOWSKI, THE ASCENT OF MAN 249 (1973); HEINZ R. PAGELS, THE COSMIC CODE:
QUANTUM PHYSICS AT THE LANGUAGE OF NATURE 18-19 (1982). From the standpoint of
moral philosophy, Newtonian determinism was deeply problematic. In a completely
deterministic universe, where all matters, including human conduct, are predetermined down to
the finest detail, moral freedom seemingly becomes impossible or, at best, illusory. Kant
addressed this problem in his CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON, which explored the conditions
of moral freedom. Kant posited that in addition to being objects of experience, human beings are
also transcendental subjects who inhabit an intelligible, supersensible or noumenal world,
wholely independent of the laws of nature, where we are capable of acting according to laws we
give ourselves and thereby become morally autonomous. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF
PRACTICAL REASON (Lewis W. Beck trans., 1949); see also MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM
AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 8-9 (1982) (discussing Kant and determinism).
16. For a discussion of Locke's influence on the drafters of the Constitution, see Thomas C.
Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 715-16 (1975) (concept of
natural rights was deeply held by framers of Constitution). See also 1 MERLE CURTI, ET AL.,
AN AMERICAN HISTORY 137, 157 (1950) (discussing the influence of Locke on Jefferson); LOUIS
HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 5-14 (1955) (discussing the deep hold of the
Lockean creed on American liberal tradition); G. EDWARD WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
LEGAL THOUGHT 24-28, 30 (1978) (discussing the influence of natural law on founding
generation); 26 THE AMERICAN NATION: A HISTORY 96-98 (Albert B. Hart ed., 1907) (Locke's
emphasis on social contract under which the majority must rule and the people must ultimately
Washington Law Review Vol. 67:755, 1992
tradition of classical republicanism, which emphasized civic virtue
over individual self-interest.17 For the generation of Americans who
witnessed the American Revolution, these "immutable principles of
natural law and abstract justice"18 were the source of all positive law.
2. Legal Positivism
The second major theory identifying supralegal norms is legal posi-
tivism. Legal postivists claim that a dominant sovereign authority
exists within each civil society to promulgate laws. 9 Thomas Hobbes,
be sovereign "fell in with the preferences of the colonists"); PURCELL, supra note 12, at 5
("During the nineteenth century Americans had generally accepted the validity of democratic
government with neither qualms nor qualifications. The democratic ideal was the unquestioned
American ideal, and it was widely accepted as an axiom of life.").
17. For a discussion of republicanism and its recent revival, see Frank I. Michelman,
Forward: Traces of Self-Government; 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 18 (1986 (describing republicanism
as the willingness to subordinate private interests to public good); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue
and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. RaV. 543, 550-62 (1986)
(describing the shift from classical republicanism to Lockean liberalism in the political
consciousness of the generation that drafted the Constitution).
18. See MORTON J. HoRowrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AME.ICAN LAW, 1768-1860, at
246 (1977). Within a setting in which scientific and moral knowledge had been firmly grounded
in immutable foundations, the American nation held a deep belief that it had an exceptional
destiny in "God's eternal plan." DOROTHY Ross, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE
26 (1991). As "nature's nation," and as God's, "America could more easily be seen as the
domain of eighteenth century natural law .... See id.; see also PERRY MILLER, NATURE'S
NATION (1967). During this period, there was a belief that there was an "American
exceptionalist vision" that viewed America as singled out by nature and God for a special
destiny. See Ross, supra this note, at 22-50; see HARTZ, supra note 16, at 35-66 (suggesting that
in 1776, Americans viewed themselves as "the Chosen People").
19. By the nineteenth century, American courts had begun gradually to shift from an
exclusive reliance on natural law in favor of a theory of law as a transformative instrument of
human will. Professor Morton Horowitz attributes this shift from natural law to the judicial
abhorrence of common law crimes. See HoRowrrz, supra note 18, at 9-16 (1977). Because
natural law underwrote positive law, including common law, a defendant could be convicted of a
common law crime if the act contravened some natural law. Courts uniformly rejected the
notion of criminal liability not linked to a statute. See id at 9-12. As a result, by the second
decade of the eighteenth century, lawyers no longer viewed natural law as the exclusive source of
positive law. See id at 30. The view that law was a political instrument of human will rather
than a manifestation of divine or natural law found fresh support in Darwin's discovery of the
theory of evolution. Darwin espoused a scientific naturalism that challenged the deterministic
dream of a universe created or directed to some overall purpose; it also challenged the long-
esteemed belief in a world of fixed structures, governed by universal, timeless laws that controlled
natural development. See PURCELL, supra note 12, at 5-10. Randomness, chance, contingency,
and variability were also significant features of the world. For the philosophers Charles Pierce,
William James, and John Dewey, the chief lesson of Darwinism was that thought and inquiry
were experimental and purposive. "The rational meaning of every proposition lies in the future,"
wrote Pierce, and that meaning is "that form in which the proposition becomes applicable to
human conduct." CHARLES S. PIERCE, WHAT PRAGMATISM IS IN PRAGMATISM: THE
CLASSICAL WRITINGS 113 (H.S. Thayer ed., 1982). James would later propose a pragmatic
theory of truth in 1898, and Dewey would later further expand and disseminate a pragmatic,
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for example, believed that norms found in nature authorized the sover-
eign to issue binding commands.2' While natural law theorists such as
Thomas Aquinas believed that the universe contained an entire code
of natural laws that were reflected in legitimate positive law,2" legal
positivists such as Hobbes used a few fundamental laws of nature to
justify the power and authority of the sovereign to enact binding, posi-
tive laws. Thus, the legitimizing element of law under legal positivism
is not the content, but the source or pedigree of the law. Hobbes's
theory was later expanded by John Austin, who exerted an enormous
influence on legal thought.22
Despite the differences, both classical theories of law- natural law
and legal positivism-were foundationalist. Both theories ultimately
trace the binding authority, and thus the legitimacy, of law to tran-
scendental, ontological foundations.
instrumental approach to social reform in the early part of the twentieth century. See H.S.
THAYER, MEANING AND ACTION: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF PRAGMATISM 5 (2d ed. 1981).
Although legal pragmatism is often identified with Pierce, James and Dewey, I suggest that a
later group of post-analytic philosophers, such as Quine, Derrida, and Gadamer, have exerted a
more direct influence on modem legal pragmatism. See infra text accompanying notes 87-102,
107, 163-75.
20. The legal theory of "Hobbes . . .purport[s] to start from a theory of natural law."
GEORGE C. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE 293 (1973). Hobbes purported to derive the principle of
the authority of the sovereign from a small set of natural laws. For example, Hobbes starts out
with the assertion that the fundamental precept of the natural law is that the individual should
do everything he possibly can to stay alive. From this Hobbes derives the view that the
individual will join a civil society and will renounce any right to base his conduct upon the law of
nature and will obey the laws of the sovereign. See id
21. Thomas Aquinas set forth the first comprehensive, foundationalist natural law theory in
the thirteenth century. Aquinas believed that a providential God created an orderly universe
that displays God's purpose throughout in the form of a systematic normative order underlying
all reality. See WEINREB, supra note 12, at 60.
22. Austin held that law was a set of rules embodying the desire of the sovereign expressed in
a command that others behave in a certain way, backed by the sovereign's power and will to
sanction disobedience. See 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 90-92, 99-100,
(Robert Campbell ed., 4th ed. 1873) (1832); JOHN AUSTIN, THE AUSTINIAN THEORY OF LAW
1-30 (W. Jethro Brown ed., 1906). Professor H.L.A. Hart's version of legal positivism set forth
in THE CONCEPT OF LAW is now generally recognized as the most powerful version of the
theory. See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 31 (1984).
For a discussion of Harts version of positivism, see infra note 286. As defined, legal positivism
includes social contract theories, which also derive their normative authority from social
agreement or consensus. The classic social contract theory is set forth in JOHN LOCKE, Two
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1960).
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B. Epistemological Foundations
The traditional model of law also contains a foundationalist episte-
mology related to the foundationalist ontology just explored.2 a
Because the traditional model viewed law as sustained by ontological
foundations, legal reasoning and legal knowledge consisted of deter-
mining when positive law accurately reflected or pictured these foun-
dations. This foundationalist epistemology, sometimes called the
"picture theory" of knowledge, held that language actually provides
objective or logical "pictures" of reality.24 Justice Story explained the
Supreme Court's foundationalist epistemology in Swift v. Tyson,25 a
landmark in classical legal thought. "[I]t will hardly be contended,"
wrote Justice Story, "that the decisions of courts constitute laws. They
are, at [the] most, only evidence of what the laws are, and are not of
themselves laws."26 Swift posited "a transcendental body of law,"'27
which, "[like] a brooding omnipresence in the sky,"' 28 was already
extant in some platonic heaven, waiting to be discovered.29
23. These two features comprised the metaphysics of classical legal thought. According to
the Kantian tradition of Western philosophy, metaphysics is concernl with final questions and
is the most basic and lofty of all branches of knowledge because metaphysics explores the very
conditions of existence that make all other branches of knowledge possible. See IMMANUEL
KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 46 (Norman K. Smith trans., 1929). Metaphysics is
concerned with ontology, a theory of what exists or what there is, and with epistemology, a
theory of knowledge. See D.W. HAMLYN, METAPHYSICS 1-10 (1984); Roger Hancock, History
of Metaphysics, in 5 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 289 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967);
Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 871, 874 (1989).
24. The "picture theory" can be traced to Plato. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC bk. 6, pt. VII
(Desmond Lee trans., 1955). Actually, the term "picture theory" of knowledge is associated
with Bertrand Russell, but more often with his one-time pupil, Ludwig Wittgenstein. Early in
his career Wittgenstein developed a highly sophisticated realist or foundationalist epistemology
referred to as the "picture theory" of language, see LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS
LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS (D.F. Pears & B.F. McGuinness trans., 1961) [hereinafter TRACTATUS
LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUs], but later abandoned that view in favor of a more pragmatic
conception of knowledge. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS
(G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1953).
25. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
26. Id. at 18.
27. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow T~xicab & Transfer Co., 276
U.S. 518, 533-35 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting), overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938).
28. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
29. Swift seems inconsistent with the positivist positions taken by Justice Story just eight
years earlier in his COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, which seems to be a clear
erosion of the natural law tradition. Justice Story's maxims of the conflict of laws held that law
is a result of territorial sovereignty, power, and consent, not natural law. See JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 19, 21-22 (1834). This inconsistency has led
commentators to suggest that Justice Story might have harbored other goals, such as a quest for
a uniform commercial law, for the decision in Swift. See HOROWTZ, supra note 18, at 249-52.
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1. Logical Argumentation
Classical legal thought viewed legal reasoning as a form of logical
deduction that proceeded in a formal manner from the law's basic axi-
oms or norms. The logical connection between an established norm
and a new legal result insured the legitimacy of the result. In judicial
decisionmaking, once it was established that a certain legal decision
logically followed from some accepted norm, then the decision became
a legal precedent and later judicial decisions sought to adhere as
closely as possible to the precedent.
Foremost among the traditional tools of logical argumentation
employed in law are the syllogism and reasoning by analogy. Taking
the syllogism as his model, one classical scholar argued that "[e]very
judicial act resulting in a judgment consists of a pure deduction."30 So
compelling is this form of reasoning that lawyers and judges often try
to make all legal reasoning seem syllogistic. The rule of law is the
major premise, the facts are the minor premise, and the judgment is
the conclusion, which is compelled by the rules of deductive logic.
Traditional legal thought views legal reasoning as proceeding in a dis-
cursive, linear fashion, much like the links of a chain.
The syllogistic nature of legal reasoning, in turn, requires the identi-
fication of an applicable rule of law that can serve as the major premise
of the syllogism. One method of identifying this rule is applying the
logical tool of analogy on existing positive law. Since positive law-
prior judicial decisions and statutes-embodied or reflected valid
supralegal norms, rules of law embedded in positive law represent
potential rules of law that can serve as the major premise of the new
syllogism needed to resolve the issue at hand. Because all legal rules
logically derived from positive law are valid, the applicable rule is the
one that encompasses all relevant features of the factual situation at
hand. For example, the common law rule of capture confers owner-
ship rights upon the first to reduce wild animals to possession. The
rule of capture, applicable by analogy to any number of fugitive
Nevertheless, Swift gave rise to an entire jurisprudence striving to distinguish between local
questions and general questions subject to this general, federal common law. See 19 C. WRIGHT
ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4502, at 6-8 (1982).
30. John M. Zane, German Legal Philosophy, 16 MICH. L. REv. 287, 338 (1918). This type of
formalistic, syllogistic approach is associated with Dean Christopher Langdell. See, eg., C.C.
LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS viii (2d ed. 1879); see also
LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-60, at 11 (1986); Martin P. Golding,
Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy in Twentieth-Century America-Major Themes and
Developments, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 441, 442-43 (1986); Joan C. Williams, Critical Legal Studies"
The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429, 429-30
(1987); POSNER, supra note 5, at 14-15.
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resources such as oil and gas, became the major premise of the new
syllogism needed by common law courts to resolve cases of first
impression in favor of the party who first "captured" the resource in
question.31
2. Textual and Statutory Interpretation
Under classical legal thought, judges and lawyers extract rules from
statutes or previous decisions and use these rules as the major premise
of a syllogism to determine the outcome of a case. The process of
extraction itself is not deductive, but is "archeological., 3 2 The mean-
ing of a legal text or statute is fixed on the date of its enactment and
the task of the interpreter is to recover or reconstruct some objective
meaning buried in the text.33 This approach assumed a high degree of
determinacy of meaning and relied heavily on the "picturing" meta-
phor of classical foundationalist epistemology. The statutory language
actually pictured some fixed, objective meaning that is separate from
and beyond the text itself and could be accessed through the text.
Although there are many variants of the traditional approach to statu-
tory interpretation, all operate within the archeological metaphor.3 4
Under the traditional approach, statutory interpretation assumed the
air of a mechanistic exercise in logic.
The traditional approach to both textual interpretation and logical
argumentation as formal, deductive reasoning is illustrated by United
States v. Butler.35 At issue before the Supreme Court was the constitu-
tionality of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, which author-
ized the Secretary of Agriculture to impose certain taxes on farmers in
31. See Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 73, 75 (1985)
("[A]nalogies to the capture of wild animals show up time and again when courts have to deal on
a nonstatutory basis with some 'fugitive' resource that is being reduced to property for the first
time."). In Hammonds v. Central Ky. Natural Gas Co., 75 S.W.2d 2C4 (Ky. 1934), overruled by
Texas Am. Energy Corp. v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 736 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1987), a gas
company injected gas into a cavity under Mrs. Hammonds' land without first securing a lease
from her. She argued that the gas company committed trespass by injecting its property under
her land. Applying the rule of capture by analogy, the court held that the gas company owned
the gas only so long as the gas remained in its possession, but once the company released the gas
to its natural habitat in underground reservoirs, the gas returned to a state of nature. Because
the company no longer owned the gas under Mrs. Hammonds' land, there was no trespass. In
another case, the defendant even argued that news and information is also a fugitive resource that
should be subject to the rule of capture. See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248
U.S. 215 (1918).
32. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20,
20-21 (1988).
33. See id. at 21-22.
34. See id.
35. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
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furtherance of a federal acreage and production reduction scheme.
The Secretary argued that Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution
authorized the Act because it conferred upon Congress power "[tlo lay
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to... provide for the
.. . general Welfare of the United States."36 Justice Roberts found
that constitutional and statutory interpretation was a simple exercise
in logic. He argued that the Court's sole judicial task was "to lay the
article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is
challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former
... and having done that, its duty ends."37 Justice Roberts' approach
assumes that the text of the Constitution and the statute contain indis-
putable, objective meanings and, like applying axioms in a geometric
proof, the judicial task is to "square" the statute with the Constitution.
Having found that nothing in the Constitution authorized the federal
regulation of agriculture through taxes or otherwise, Justice Roberts
struck the statute down.38
3. The Autonomous Nature of Law
Classical legal thought viewed legal reasoning as a species of objec-
tive, artificial reasoning, accessible only to those with specialized train-
ing in law.39 Law itself was viewed as an autonomous discipline. It
had well-defined limits, clearly distinct from, although related to,
other disciplines such as moral theory and politics. Unlike politics,
which reflects majoritarian preferences of the present, law reflected
timeless and universal norms. Unlike morality, which is individualis-
tic, law transcended the personal preferences of the judge, but was
grounded in underlying, eternal foundations. Thus, rules of law could,
and often were expected to, operate in ways that were inconsistent
with the moral or political views of the legal decisionmakers. Indeed,
this feature was deemed to be one of the supreme virtues of law: it was
above and apart from personalities and politics.
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8[l].
37. 297 U.S. at 62-63.
38. Id. at 78. As we shall later see, legal pragmatists argue that no one ever rigidly adhered to
the traditional model and that statutory interpretation, despite claims to the contrary such as
those of Justice Roberts, has always proceeded in a non-foundationalist, pragmatic fashion.
39. See HoRowrrz, supra note 18, at 256-57; see also Richard A. Posner, The Decline ofLaw
as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987 100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987); POSNER supra note 5,
at 10.
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II. LEGAL PRAGMATISM AND THE REJECTION OF
ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS
Beginning early in the twentieth century, influential movements in
modem science and philosophy began to challenge the validity of
ontological foundations." One powerful branch of philosophy, logical
positivism, used the logical analysis of language to demonstrate that
all metaphysical statements that purported to describe a supersensible,
transcendental reality, including statements about ontological founda-
tions, were utterly meaningless.4 Although no longer a viable move-
ment,42 logical positivism was a "revolutionary force in philosophy"43
and has left a legacy of antipathy to metaphysics in twentieth century
legal thought" and in contemporary philosophy. For example, the
pragmatic philosopher Richard Rorty admonishes us that there is sim-
ply nothing "out there" that we can point to or hold up in order to
40. Until the twentieth century, the prevailing scientific framework was Newtonian
determinism, which posited a completely deterministic universe within a framework of absolute
space and time. In the early twentieth century, Einstein's discovery of the theory of relativity
eventually shattered the Newtonian paradigm. See HAWKING, supra note 15, at 33; PAGELS,
supra note 15, at 19-20, 27. Einstein's revolution led the logical positivists to rethink the whole
concept of scientific knowledge. For a history of logical positivism, see LOGICAL POSrrlvSM
(A.J. Ayer ed., 1959).
41. Abstracting the language of science into its most basic form, that of mathematical logic,
the logical positivists sought to expose the spurious nature of some traditional philosophical
problems, such as those of metaphysics, and refocus philosophy on genuine theoretical issues.
See Rudolf Carnap, The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language, in
LOGICAL POSmVISM 60 (A.J. Ayer ed., 1959). The logical positivists demonstrated that
traditional metaphysics, such as problems concerning some transcendental reality beyond all
possible sense experience or being in itself, actually consists of co3gnitively or theoretically
meaningless statements. Metaphysical problems were the result of imperfections in ordinary
language and a logically perfect language would allow the elimination of all traditional
metaphysics. See id For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Chow, supra note 6, at
242-47.
42. See FREDERICK SUPPE, Introduction to THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES 4
(Frederick Suppe ed., 1974) (logical positivism is no longer accepted as the paradigm for science);
see also HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY 187 (1981) (logical positivism "began
to disintegrate by 1950").
43. PETER ACHINSTEIN & STEPHEN F. BARKER, Preface to THE LEGACY OF LOGICAL
PosrrivIsM 5 (Peter Achinstein & Stephen F. Barker eds., 1969). For a discussion of the
importance of the movement, see LOGIC AND LANGUAGE (1st & 2d series) (Antony Flew ed.,
Anchor Books 1965); TWENTIETH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHY: THE ANALYTIC TRADITION
(Morris Weitz ed., 1966); SUPPE, supra note 42.
44. The logical positivists influenced the legal realist movement, which rejected abstract
concepts in favor of concrete, hard facts. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and
the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809 (1935). Logical positivism's influence
continues to be felt today because legal realism is an ancestor of the law and economics
movement in moderm legal thought. For a further discussion of the influence of logical
positivism on legal realism, see Chow, supra note 6, at 247-51.
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justify a particular norm or principle.45 These views have deeply influ-
enced modem legal pragmatism.
Another branch of philosophy, existentialism, stressing humanistic
concerns, scorned the notion that transcendental foundations can
serve as a moral compass for human conduct. Existentialist philoso-
phers, particularly Jean-Paul Sartre, warned that reliance on such
truths is a form of self-deception, a misconceived and impossible
escape from human responsibility.
Sartre explored these themes in The Wall, a short story about the
imprisonment and torture of an ardent resistance fighter during the
Spanish Civil War. The central metaphor of the story is the execu-
tioner's wall where prisoners face the firing squads of the ruling fascist
government. When confronted with death, the story's protagonist,
Pablo Ibbieta, realizes that there are no eternal foundations supporting
his once cherished values.' Just as the wall signals the end of mortal
life, the path to eternity also is blocked by an impenetrable "wall."
"At that moment I felt that I had my whole life in front of me and I
thought, 'It's a damned lie.'... I had spent my time counterfeiting
eternity, I had understood nothing."'47 Feeling betrayed by a false
belief in eternity, Ibbieta's revolutionary zeal vanishes and his ardent
desire for life dissolves into indifference, even in the face of threats of
imminent death.4" The story's ironic ending punctuates the absurdity
of a life guided by belief in moral foundationalism.4 9
Like other existentialists, Sartre emphasized the themes of human
freedom, responsibility and choice in a world without foundations. At
the same time, he warned his audience about the self-deceiving search
45. See RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM xix-xxviii (1982) [hereinafter
CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM] ("[The Myth of the Given is] the impossible attempt to step
outside our skins... and compare ourselves with something absolute .... [The pragmatist]
"does not understand the notion of 'there being - out there' ... ."). Rorty's views are set
forth in RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979). Other notable
works exhibiting an anti-metaphysical stance are RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND
OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAxIS (1983); BERNARD
WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY (1985); SANDEL, supra note 15.
46. See Jean-Paul Sartre, The Wall, in EXISTENTIALISM FROM DOSTOEVSKY TO SARTRE
(Walter Kaufmann ed., 1965).
47. Id. at 292.
48. Id. at 293-94. "In the state I was in, if someone had come and told me I could go home
quietly, that they would leave me my life whole, it would have left me cold: several hours or
several years of waiting is all the same when you have lost the illusion of being eternal." Id.
49. Gambling with his life during an interrogation by government soldiers concerning the
whereabouts of Ramon Gris, a leader of the resistance, bbieta invents a story that Gris is hiding
in a local cemetery. As it turns out, Gris, who has had an argument with his protectors, had set
out on his own to hide in the cemetery. The soldiers find and kill Gris and, as a result, spare
Ibbetia's life. See id at 298-99.
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for illusory, eternal truths. These existential themes would foreshadow
similar themes in critical pragmatism.50
A. The Rise of Critical Legal Pragmatism
Critical legal pragmatism assimilates these insights into a critique of
law. Although these scholars defy rigid classification, all critical
pragmatists share a common orientation: they reject the existence of
ontological foundations that justify supralegal norms. Once we reject
ontological foundations and the inevitability of existing legal norms,
the undesirable effects of these norms upon the legal system are no
longer natural and inevitable. Rather, these effects are revealed to be
choices made by the empowered and law is exposed as a device to
disguise the moral and political nature of the choices made. Beyond
this common focus, critical legal pragmatists divide into three groups:
critical legal studies, critical race scholarship, and critical feminisim.
Each group views the flaws of the traditional model of law from a
different perspective.
L Critical Legal Studies
The critical legal studies movement attacks traditional legal thought
as based on a false belief in ontological foundations. Critical legal
scholars scorn the traditional view that rules of law mirror or repre-
sent some external, platonic legal rules or concepts "sitting out there
ready for us to pick up, like manna from heaven."51 Critical legal
scholars, such as Professor Joseph Singer, urge us "[to] give up the
idea that the legal system has a foundation, a 'rational basis.' ,52 Once
we realize that law is not sustained by ontological foundations, the
traditional model of law is exposed as an attempt to disguise the real-
ity that law is the result of illegitimate hierarchies. 3 Thus, law is not
50. See, e.g., Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutioaalism, 88 MICH. L. REv.
641, 683 (1990) ("[The] existential understanding of freedom, choice, possibility, and openness
has had tremendous influence on the Critical Legal Studies movement.").
51. Singer, supra note 6, at 29.
52. Id. at 66. For other examples of critical legal studies, see Gerald E. Frug, The City as a
Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1057 (1980); Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in
American Law, 97 HARV. L. RaV. 1276 (1984); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in
Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976) [hereinafter Form and Substance];
Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BumF. L. REV. 205 (1979)
[hereinafter The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries]; Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of
American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151 (1985). For a further discussion of critical legal studies'
challenge to traditional legal thought, see infra text accompanying notes 110-20.
53. See Singer, supra note 6, at 68-69. Gary Peller argues that in the early twentieth century,
the liberty of contract cases promulgated the view that inequalities in socio-economic status were
a given and natural part of human nature. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915),
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the justifiable use of power, law is naked power. Once we demystify
law, then we become empowered because we are free to determine our
own destiny rather than constrained by law that reinforces the status
quo.
5 4
2. Critical Race Scholarship
Critical race scholarship "refers to the work of progressive legal
scholars of color who are attempting to develop a jurisprudence that
accounts for the role of racism in American law.""5 Critical race
scholars reject objective, immutable foundations for law and argue
that, as a consequence, social inequities caused by the legal system are
not natural and inevitable but are the results of choices made by the
empowered majority. 6 This insight allows us to use law to redress,
rather than reinforce, the inequalities of the past and present.
A central feature of critical race scholarship is the concept of the
voice of color.57 Rooted in oppression, this voice, even with its some-
times confficting messages,58 possesses a singular insight and even
overruled by NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (social and economic
inequalities are the natural and legitimate result of the exercise of contract rights). See Peller,
supra note 52, at 1193-1219 (discussing how liberty of contract cases enforced inequalities of
wealth, education and status as natural features of society).
54. See Singer, supra note 6, at 62.
55. See Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a
Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1331 n.7 (1991) [hereinafter
Voices of America]. I use Professor Matsuda's own definition so as not to distort the voice of
critical legal scholars. For other examples of critical race scholarship, see Kimberle W.
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Richard Delgado, The Imperial
Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 561 (1984)
[hereinafter The Imperial Scholar]; Richard Delgado, When a Story is Just a Story: Does Voice
Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REv. 95 (1990) [hereinafter Does Voice Really Matter?]; Alex M.
Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007 (1991); Charles R. Lawrence, The Id,
the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317
(1987); Mar J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem, 63 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1763 (1990) [hereinafter Pragmatism Modified]; Mar J. Matsuda, Public Response to
Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989).
56. See, eg., Crenshaw, supra note 55, at 1351-52, 1354 (supposedly neutral, immutable
standards subordinate minorities); Does Voice Really Matter?, supra note 55, at 100-01 (existing
merit criteria for scholarship may be source of bias rather than neutral instruments); The
Imperial Scholar, supra note 55, at 566 (legal academy systematically excludes minority
scholarship on civil rights).
57. See generally Johnson, supra note 55. But cf Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of
LegalAcademia, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1745 (1989) (rejecting the notion that minorities speak with
a distinctive voice).
58. The voice of color is not monolithic but contains different dialects, including even a
dialect that has incorporated majoritarian standards. See Johnson, supra note 55, at 2009, 2111.
Johnson refers to this dialect of the voice of color subscribing to majoritarian standards as the
"Hierarchical Majoritarian" variation of the voice of color. So long as the speakers draw on
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moral authority on certain race related issues.59 Speaking in this
voice, critical race scholars tell us that law is actually permeated by an
overriding hidden social standard, or point of comparison, and that
standard is white.' Whatever complies with the standard is viewed as
normal and whatever does not is viewed as subordinate, inferior, or
deviant.6 '
For example, in Voices of America, Professor Mari Matsuda
explores the legality of the practice of some employers who deny
employment to applicants who speak with an accent.62 She argues
that the notion that some Americans speak with an accent whereas
other Americans do not presupposes a hidden norm of non-accent, a
linguistic impossibility since there is no vantage point of a neutral,
standard pronunciation. The notion of a standard, generic American
accent actually describes the pronunciation of a small group of the
white upper-class. Due to their disproportionate power and influence,
this elite sets the standard for what is normal for everyone else. All
pronunciation that deviates from the pronunciation of the white
upper-class is deemed to be accented, as opposed to standard, speech.
As a result, many nonwhite, ethnic, regional, and lower-class forms of
pronunciation are deemed to be subnormal and, thus, accented
speech.63
Unless one can say based upon some transcendental, objective
norm, that one accent is correct, there is no justification for hierarchy
in accent. To the extent that differences in accen't are placed into a
their experiences and insights gained as persons of color, they speak in the voice of color even if
they have "determined that the best strategy to achieve progress ... is via an 'integrationist,'
mainstream approach that embraces the so-called 'neutral' evaluative norms of the dominant
cultural group." See id. at 2016. Johnson suggests that Professors Randall Kennedy and
Stephen Carter speak in this new dialect. See Stephen L. Carter, Tie Best Black, and Other
Tales, in I RECONSTRUCTION No. 1 (1990); Kennedy, supra note 57.
By contrast, the more generalized voice of color is the "Monistic" dialect associated with
Professors Delgado and Matsuda. See Johnson, supra note 55, at 2011. The Monistic voice
stresses the perspective of those who have been oppressed and this is often associated with low
socioeconomic class. See id, at 2027, 2035. Both of these variations of the voice of color share
the common goal of eradicating racism in law. See id. at 2052-53 ("There is no doubt... [of]
the worthiness of the battle. Carter and Matsuda, Kennedy and Delgado-the fight goes on.").
59. See Mari J. Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in Plowed-
Up Ground, I 1 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1988); Mad J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical
Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323 (1987); Pragmatism Modified,
supra note 55, at 1766-68; see also Johnson, supra note 55, at 2012; Does Voice Really Matter?,
supra note 55, at 95, 98-99.
60. See Crenshaw, supra note 55, at 1369; Voices of America, supra note 55, at 1361.
61. See Voices of America, supra note 55, at 1361.
62. Accent refers to intonation, stress, and rhythm in the pronunciation of words. See id. at
1360.
63. See id. at 1375.
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hierarchy, the hierarchy reflects the values of the empowered. By
according weight and respect to the voice of color, society can correct
the otherwise unjust and often iniquitous consequences of social and
racial hierarchies.
3. Feminist Legal Scholarship
Feminist legal scholarship seeks to expose the unstated patriarchal
norms underlying law. In Justice Engendered," Professor Martha
Minow argues that like other fields,65 law purports to be based upon
objective and neutral foundations, but since such foundations are
impossible, law actually embodies a hidden male norm or perspec-
tive.66 So powerful and entrenched that it often becomes the unstated
default reference point,6 7 this norm defines men as the starting point of
comparisons. Women's differences from men thus make women infer-
ior, deviant, or exceptional.68 Feminist theory seeks to expose these
unstated reference points by revealing that the purportedly neutral
64. Martha Minow, Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987).
65. Feminists have long argued against male domination in diverse fields and contexts. See,
e-g., SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (H. M. Parshley ed. & trans., 1974); BETrY
FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963); GERMAINE GREER, THE FEMALE ENUNCH
(1971); CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987). There are various
strands of feminism, including strands that are "liberal, Marxist, radical, socialist,
psychoanalytic, existentialist, and postmodern." Margaret J. Radin, The Pragmatist and the
Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1706 (1990); see also Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of
Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1373 n.2 (1986) (noting that feminism is
not a monolithic movement, but includes divergent positions). I do not attempt to discuss
feminism in general, but examine those aspects of feminism that are relevant to the new wave of
pragmatism. For other examples of this type of feminist work, see Martha Minow & Elizabeth
V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597 (1990); Catharine Wells, Situated
Decisionmaking, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1728 (1990).
66. See Minow, supra note 64, at 39-45. For one example, see H. GROSS, CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS 62-65 (1924) (arguing that biological differences between men and women
make men much more reliable and credible witnesses).
67. See Minow, supra note 64, at 39.
68. Under the assumptions of foundationalism, these results were often presented as natural
and inevitable. For example, In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232 (1875), the Wisconsin Supreme Court
refused the admission of Lavinia Goodell to the bar, stating:
The law of nature destines and qualifies the female sex for the bearing and nurture of the
children of our race and for the custody of the homes of the world and their maintenance in
love and honor. And all life-long callings of women, inconsistent with these radical and
sacred duties of their sex, as is the profession of the law, are departures from the order of
nature.
Id. at 245. See also Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141-42 (1873) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause did not entitle Myra Bradwell to a
license to practice law because "[tihe paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the
noble and benign office of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. And the rules of civil
society must be adapted to the general constitution of things.").
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and uncoerced status quo actually hides the implicit norms of the rul-
ing patriarchy.69
For example, employment laws often assume implicitly that the
work place is designed for men or non-pregnant persons.7" Given the
male norm as a starting point, a principle of equal treatment would
accord identical rights to both men and women.71 Because pregnancy
is a condition of women only, courts may view this condition as being
different from the norm of non-pregnancy and may refuse to grant
legal protection to pregnant women because this would constitute spe-
cial treatment.72 Pregnant women, however, are different only by
implicit comparison to the male norm.
In other areas, such as cases involving divorce and child custody,
women are compromised by an implicit judicial assumption that
women have the same resources and career options as men.73 Indeed,
the unstated male norm can become so well-established that it
becomes embedded and disguised in language itself. For example,
take the seemingly neutral category "mother." 4  Categories like
"unwed mother" and "working mother" modify the general category
"mother" and indicate that the default reference point is a married
housewife.71 The default reference point generates an implicit proto-
type that structures expectations and influences values. At the same
time, it goes unstated and is assumed to be based upon the natural
foundations of human nature.76
B. Pragmatism and Legitimacy
These pragmatic critiques of the traditional model raise disturbing
questions. At their most fundamental level, the critiques are concep-
tual and philosophical rather than empirical. Under the traditional
model, the political and moral obligation to obey law was sustained by
69. These arguments are made especially forcefully by Professor Catherine MacKinnon. See
MAcKINNON, supra note 65.
70. See Minow, supra note 64, at 40-41.
71. See Scales, supra note 65, at 1374 ("In this country, the engine of the struggle for equality
has been Aristotelian: Equality means to treat like persons alike, and unlike persons unlike.").
72. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (exclusion of pregnant women from
unemployment benefits is not sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause). Geduldig
was superseded by statute. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S.
669 (1983); see also Minow, supra note 64, at 43.
73. See Minow, supra note 64, at 43.
74. Minow adopts this example from GEORGE LAKOF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS
THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987). See Minow, supra note 64, at
44.
75. See Minow, supra note 64, at 44.
76. See id.
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ontological foundations. The critical pragmatists' rejection of onto-
logical foundations undermines the justification of legal obligation
and, unless an alternative justification is proposed, law and arbitrary
power are indistinguishable. If the traditional model of law is like an
edifice with an elaborate ontology as its foundation, once the founda-
tion is destroyed, it follows that the whole edifice crumbles. As we
shall see in the next part, not only do legal pragmatists reject ontologi-
cal foundationalism, but many also reject epistemological foundation-
alism. The rejection of epistemological foundationalism potentially
undermines the legitimacy of law in a second way by raising the possi-
bility that the tools of legal reasoning are flawed by a high degree of
indeterminacy.
As we shall see in the last two parts of this Article, legal pragmatists
also offer a positive, normative account of law, but they avoid the use
of both ontological and epistemological foundationalism. Before
examining the pragmatists' positive account and reconstruction of law,
however, I complete the examination of the pragmatists' critique of
the traditional model of law by exploring the second prong of the
pragmatists' critique: the rejection of epistemological foundationalism.
III. PRAGMATISM AND THE REJECTION OF
EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONALISM
Modern pragmatists reject epistemological foundationalism-the
view that beliefs constitute true knowledge when they actually reflect
or mirror some fixed, external substratum of reality.77  Rather,
pragmatists measure the validity of a belief by assessing how well that
belief coheres with other beliefs. All legal pragmatists adopt some ver-
sion of a pragmatic, coherentist epistemology.
A. The Cornerstone of Epistemological Foundationalism
Epistemological foundationalism has venerable roots in Western
intellectual thought, traceable to Plato.7 In its modern period since
Descartes, 9 Western philosophy has sustained epistemological
77. See CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM, supra note 45, at xxviii.
78. See supra note 24; see also Williams, supra note 30, at 433.
79. Descartes initiated a new period of philosophical rationalism by rescuing Europe from the
darkness of religious and philosophical skepticism. See RICHARD H. POPKIN, THE HISTORY OF
SKEPTICISM FROM ERASMUS TO SPINOZA 1-66 (1979); Myles Burnyeat, Introduction to THE
SKEPTICAL TRADITION (Myles Burnyeat ed., 1983). Descartes insisted that it was possible to
overcome all possible doubt to arrive at a single indubitable truth, the cogito, as well as the
criteria of truth, clarity and distinctness. See RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON METHOD AND
MEDITATIONS 24-25 (Laurence J. Lafleur trans., 1960). "On [Descartes'] view the human mind
is like a mirror that reflects what there is when it has been wiped clean." H.B. Action, Idealism,
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foundationalism by relying heavily upon a distinction explained by
Immanuel Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason.8 0 Kant posited a fun-
damental cleavage between analytic and synthetic judgments.81 Ana-
lytic judgments are true by virtue of linguistic meanings whereas
synthetic judgments are true or false by virtue of the test of experience.
The analytic statement, "all bachelors are unmarried" is true by virtue
of linguistic meanings and the denial of its truth is self-contradictory.
Whether the synthetic statement "Oliver is a bachelor" is true or false
cannot be determined without an empirical investigation.
Expressed in many ways throughout Western intellectual history, 2
the analytic/synthetic distinction is, as Richard Rorty notes, "the
central presupposition of Philosophy: that true sentences divide into
an upper and a lower division-the sentences which correspond to
something and those which are 'true' only by courtesy or conven-
tion.""3  Since this distinction explains how objective knowledge of
the world is possible, it is also the cornerstone of epistemological
foundationalism.84
A foundationalist epistemology must give an account of how we can
have objective knowledge independent of language because language is
a social convention. The analytic/synthetic distinction achieves that
result. The truth of each statement depends on a linguistic and/or an
in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 118 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967). Descartes' refutations of
skepticism have earned him the title of the "originator of modern philosophy." Laurence J.
Lafleur, Introduction to RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON METHOD AND MEDITATIONS at vii
(Laurence . Lafleur trans., 1960). Since Descartes, Western philosophy has asserted that there
are certain privileged representations, which having captured the "glassy essence" of reality,
reveal themselves by their form to be objective truths about the world. See RICHARD RORTY,
PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 42-45 (1979).
80. See KANT, supra note 23; see also IMMANUEL KANT, PROLEGOMENA TO ANY FUTURE
METAPHYSICS (Carus trans., 1950) (restating many of the themes of thz Critique in a shorter and
more accessible form). For a good general introduction to Kant, see S. KORNER, KANT (1955).
81. Kant wrote:
In all judgments in which the relation of a subject to the predicate is thought ... [, this
relation is possible in two different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as
something which is (covertly) contained in the concept A; or B lies outside the concept A,
although it does indeed stand in connection with it. In the one case I entitle the judgment
analytic, in the other synthetic.
KANT, supra note 23, at 48.
82. David Hume made a similar distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact,
and Leibniz contrasted truths of reason and truths of fact. See WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE,
Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 20 (1953). Other thinkers
have distinguished the semantic and the pragmatic, the linguistic and the empirical, and theory
and observation. See CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM, supra note 45, at xviii.
83. CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM, supra note 45, at xviii.
84. See GUSTAV BERGMANN, Two Cornerstones of Empiricism, in THE METAPHYSICS OF
LOGICAL POSITIVISM (1954).
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extra-linguistic, factual component.8 5 Analytic statements, such as the
theorems of mathematics and logic, are true by virtue of linguistic
meanings or logical form alone. They fall into the lower echelon of
true sentences because they convey truths about the conventions of
language or about logical form; about the world, however, they "say
nothing." 6 In the case of synthetic statements, the factual component
determines the truth of the statement. Synthetic statements, such as
the laws of physics and biology, fall into the upper echelon; they are
true because they correspond to the world.
B. Undermining Epistemological Foundationalism
In From a Logical Point of View, published in 1953, the pragmatic
philosopher W.V.O. Quine challenged epistemological foundational-
ism in the Kant-Descartes tradition by attacking the analytic/syn-
thetic distinction itself. Quine begins with a devastating attack on
traditional attempts to give a satisfactory account of analyticity and
argues that such an account is impossible.8 7 Quine then rejects the
notion underlying synthetic judgments, that each of our statements
can individually be tested by experience.88 Rather, Quine makes the
"countersuggestion... that our statements about the external world
face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a
corporate body."8 9 Rejecting the foundationalist metaphor of knowl-
edge as an edifice built on a foundation, Quine offers instead the meta-
phor of knowledge as a web of beliefs.' He suggests that the test for
truth is not one of correspondence, as the foundationalists would
maintain, but one of coherence. The truth of any statement depends
on how it coheres with other established beliefs rather than how that
statement corresponds to a unique set of sense data.
85. See QUINE, supra note 82, at 36-37, 41.
86. TRACTATUS LOGIcO-PHILOSOPHICUS supra note 24 (quoted in GEORGE D. ROMANOS,
QUINE AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY 3 (1983)). Even the propositions of mathematics "simply
record our determination to use symbols in a certain fashion." ALFRED JULES AYER,
LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC 31 (1946).
87. See QUINE, supra note 82, at 20-37.
88. See id. at 37-42.
89. Id. at 41. Quine states:
The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most causal matter of geography
and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and
logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges. Or, to
change the figure, total science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are
experience.
Id. at 42.
90. See id at 41; W.V. QUINE & J.S. ULLIA,, THE WEB OF BELIEF (2d ed. 1978).
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For example, suppose someone claims to have refuted the law of
gravity and persuades observers to witness an experiment in which a
dropped object does not fall to the earth but remains suspended in
mid-air. Despite this demonstration, observers are unlikely to reject
the law of gravity. Rather, given an experience that is inconsistent
with our system of beliefs, we may revise related beliefs in order to
maintain consistency within the system. Quine explains:
A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in
the interior of the field .... Reevaluation of some statements entails
reevaluation of others, because of their logical interconnections-the
logical laws being in turn simply certain further statements of the sys-
tem, certain further elements of the field .... But the total field is so
underdetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there is
much latitude of choice as to what statements to reevaluate in light of
any single contrary experience. 9 1
Since we choose which beliefs to revise based upon pragmatic con-
siderations, we are unlikely to revise fundamental beliefs that will have
a rippling effect throughout the entire system. The law of gravity is so
deeply embedded in our structure of beliefs and so many other beliefs
depend on it that we are reluctant to abandon it in the face of a single
recalcitrant experience. We would likely revise other beliefs concern-
ing what we were witnessing. Thus, we might wonder whether invisi-
ble wires are suspending the object or whether we are being misled by
some other ingenious trick that creates the illusion. There is no single
belief, such as the law of gravity, that is uniquely associated with this
event that we are required to reject as being false.
It follows as a corollary from this position that no statement is true
in any absolute sense and that any statement is subject to revision. 92
We could reject even axioms of geometry, such as a straight line is the
shortest distance between two points or arithmetic truths such as "15
+ 36 = 51." We choose to adhere to these beliefs because their rejec-
tion would entail massive changes throughout our entire system of
beliefs, not because these statements display some epistemic quality
that guarantees their truth.
Conversely, any statement may be held true come what may if we
are willing to make enough adjustments within our system of beliefs. 93
For example, the early astronomer Ptolemy conceived of a geocentric
universe, with a stationary earth in the center and the sun and planets
91. See QUINE, supra note 82, at 42-43.
92. Id. at 43.
93. See id.
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rotating around the earth in perfect concentric circles.94 As centuries
passed, inconsistencies in observation challenged this system. Ptole-
maic astronomers responded by introducing increasingly elaborate
conceptual modifications to the basic theory. When Copernicus intro-
duced a heliocentric theory, all of the deviations from the basic geo-
centric theory were explained by the simple hypothesis that the sun
was in the center of the solar system and the earth revolved around the
sun in an elliptical orbit. Still, the Copernican theory was not able to
predict the movement of the planets in a way that was demonstrably
superior to the Ptolemaic theory. Ptolemaic theory remained accurate
so long as further complications were added to the theory. What
finally convinced the scientific community to adopt the Copernican
theory was the pragmatic consideration of its simplicity and ele-
gance.95 Nothing, however, prevented science from maintaining the
Ptolemaic theory if scientists were willing to fill the entire sky with an
immense and unwieldy conceptual gadgetry.
According to Quine, "[o]ur standard for appraising basic changes of
conceptual scheme must be, not a realistic standard of correspondence
to reality, but a pragmatic standard." 96 Given this view, Quine asserts
that it "becomes folly" to maintain the analytic/synthetic distinc-
tion.97 There are two effects of abandoning the distinction. First,
there is a blurring of the supposedly distinct boundaries separating the
various disciplines of knowledge. 98 Thus, for example, natural sci-
ence, once viewed as a discrete discipline with unique epistemological
status, differs only in degree and not in kind from ancient mythol-
ogy.99 We now prefer empirical science to ancient myths or cultural
legends, but only because science has proved to be more efficacious for
managing the flux of experience.) °° This tenet of post-analytic episte-
mology is expressed by legal pragmatists who reject the notion that
law is a self-contained, autonomous discipline characterized by the
94. The following account is derived from THOMAS S. KUHN, THE COPERNICAN
REVOLUTION (1957) and THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
(1962).
95. See QuINm, supra note 82, at 79 ('Elegance can make the difference between a
psychologically manageable conceptual scheme and one that is too unwieldy for our poor minds
to cope effectively. Where this happens, elegance is simply a means to the end of a pragmatically
acceptable conceptual scheme.").
96. Id.
97. Id. at 43.
98. See id. at 20.
99. See id. at 44-45.
100. See id. at 44. Einstein's theory and Homer's gods are on the same footing as "neither
better nor worse except for differences in the degree to which they expedite our dealings with
sense experiences." Id. at 45.
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artificial use of reason, peculiar to law as opposed to other fields. 10 1
The second effect of abandoning the analytic/synthetic distinction is
the abandonment of a foundationalist epistemology and "a shift
toward pragmatism."' 102 The following section explores this shift
toward epistemological pragmatism.
C. A Pragmatic, Coherentist Epistemology
One implication of a coherentist epistemology is that all knowledge
is radically pluralistic and relativistic. That Quine's position seems to
lead to radical skepticism or irrationalism is clear and continues to be
a popular interpretation of Quine. 103 The pluralist argues that Quine
paints "a picture of all inquiry as a more or less useful kind of myth
making." 1" Under a pluralistic conception of knowledge, we con-
struct many different versions of the world, those of science, of com-
mon sense, music, literature, but none of these versions is closer to
reality or a more accurate representation of it than others. There are
as many versions of reality as we wish to construct and find to be
useful. 1
0 5
From extreme pluralism and relativism, it is a single step to radical
and nihilistic skepticism.106 If all knowledge is a social construct,
including our immediate knowledge of the world, then it follows that
we can never say anything true about the world nor hope to describe
the world accurately. Since all that passes for knowledge is a mental
101. Critical pragmatists often invoke emotion, introspection, and personal narratives in
support of their positions. See eg., Voices of America, supra note 55, at 1331 (using eclectic
methods of personal experience, emotion and desire alongside logic and analysis in arguing
against discrimination based on accent); see also Singer, supra note 6, at 66-69. On the other
hand, prudential pragmatists also acknowledge the same insight. For example, Judge Posner has
stated that law is "a mixture of applied logic, rhetoric, moral and political philosophy,
economics, and familiarity with a specialized vocabulary and a particular body of texts, practices,
and institutions." See Richard A. Posner, Conventionalism: The Key to Law as an Autonomous
Discipline?, 38 U. TORONTO L.J. 333, 345 (1988) [hereinafter Conventionalism]; see also Posner,
supra note 39, at 762. To be sure, other developments, such as application of other fields,
especially economics and philosophy, to law, the diversity in the composition and political beliefs
of current law faculties, and a series of setbacks, including a flawed bankruptcy code, have all
contributed to the decline of law as an autonomous discipline. See id. at 766-67, 769-70. No
doubt the political turmoil and social upheaval of the 1960s also had some influence. See Mark
Tushnet, Critical Legal Studie" A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515, 1530-34 (1991).
102. See QUINE, supra note 82, at 20.
103. CHRISTOPHER HOOKWAY, QUINE 51 (1988).
104. See id.
105. See id. at 52.
106. ERNST CASSIRER, LANGUAGE AND MYTH 7 (Susanne K. Langer trans., 1946) ("[lIt is
but a single step to the conclusion which the modem skeptical critirs. of language have drawn:
the complete dissolution of any alleged truth content of language, and the realization that this
content is nothing but a sort of phantasmagoria of the spirit.").
Vol. 67:755, 1992
A Pragmatic Model of Law
construct that has no necessary tie to the external world, objective
knowledge that actually represents states of affairs in the world is, on
this view, impossible.
1. Skepticism and Indeterminacy
As articulated by modem thinkers, radical skepticism includes the
view that language is radically indeterminate. This view is advanced
by such modern philosophers as Jacques Derrida,10 7 and is a major
feature of modern critical scholarship. Under the foundationalist or
"picture theory" of language, the meaning of language is fixed and
determinate. Indeed, the "picture theory of language," developed by
Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein, asserted that synthetic
statements actually provide logical pictures of reality whereas analytic
statements provide pictures of the logical form of language. 10 8 Once
we reject the analytic/synthetic distinction, we must also abandon the
notion that the meaning of words is a logical picture or fixed by exter-
nal referents. Instead, under a coherentist epistemology, the meaning
of language is determined by the coherence of words with other words
or propositions within our socially constructed web of beliefs. Since it
is impossible to trace all of the myriad interconnections of words
throughout the entire system of beliefs, it is not possible to achieve
closure on the meaning of any word or sentence. Thus, according to
Derrida and modem critical scholars, the meaning of language always
remains indeterminate in varying degrees. 10 9
2. Indeterminacy and the Problem of Legitimacy
Earlier, we saw that the rejection of ontological foundations poten-
tially undermines the legitimacy of the traditional model of law. By
107. Jacques Derrida, a leading skeptical critic of language, argues that the goal of modem
criticism should be the deconstruction of all texts, the exposure of the indeterminacy and
contingency of purportedly foundational truths. Derrida has been called "the modern father of
deconstruction" who "has danced on the graves of all our hallowed certainties." MODERN
MOVEMENTS IN EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY 113 (Richard Kearney ed., 1986). Derrida argues that
every text subverts its own claim to determinacy. Derrida undermines traditional notions of
thinking and denies that there is a cleavage between philosophical, rationalist discourse and
aesthetic discourse. See JACQUES DERRIDA, DISSEMINATION (1972); JACQUES DERRIDA, GLAS
(1974); JACQUES DERRIDA, MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY (1972); JACQUES DERRIDA, OF
GRAMMATOLOGY (1967); JACQUES DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE (1967). Derrida has
deeply influenced critical legal scholarship. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 55, (using Derrida's
techniques to expose racism in mainstream legal thought); Peller, supra note 52 (using Derrida's
deconstructionist techniques to critique classic legal thought and some strands of legal realism).
108. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
109. See Peller, supra note 52, at 1167-68. For further discussion of the indeterminacy thesis
in critical scholarship, see infra text accompanying notes 110-20.
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rejecting epistemological foundationalism as well, the critical
pragmatists raise a second challenge to the legitimacy of the tradi-
tional model: the problem of indeterminacy.
Critical legal scholars often assert that in any given legal doctrine,
almost every legal rule is opposed by one or more equally applicable
counterrules. Since the rule and the counterrules support divergent
and often opposite results and since there are no meta-rules determin-
ing how to choose the applicable rule, the judge's discretion in choos-
ing which rule to apply, not legal doctrine, determines the outcome of
cases.110 In other variants of this argument, critical legal scholars
argue that for every legal rule, there are numerous exceptions that a
judge is free to invoke. 1 ' Moreover, the existence of general princi-
ples of constitutional or common law that nullify specific rules poten-
tially renders every legal decision indeterminate." 2
A second type of argument used by critical scholars is that all legal
rules are to some extent open textured or lack closure. This allows
significant, even uncontrolled, manipulation by the decisionmaker."13
Not only are broad legal rules such as "be fair" or "liability is based
on fault" plainly ambiguous, but, so are other seemingly clear rules.
Professor Duncan Kennedy cites the supposedly clear directive that a
contract will be rescinded for mutual mistake going to the "substance"
or "essence" of the transaction, but not for a mistake going to a "mere
quality or accident" even though that quality may have been the sole
reason for the transaction. 4 In the name of this rule, however, courts
engage in a balancing of equities, freeing judicial discretion to deter-
mine the outcome of the case."'
Even the most seemingly clear text, such as the constitutional provi-
sion requiring a minimal presidential age of thirty-five, is indetermi-
110. Professor Duncan Kennedy gives the following example from contract law. Agreements
that gratuitously increase the obligations of one contracting party are unenforceable for want of
consideration unless the judge can find an implied rescission of the old contract and the
formation of a new one incorporating the unilaterally onerous terms. This allowed skillful judges
to vitiate any contract by accounting for duress in the process of renegotiation, but the rule
merely caused confusion when skill was lacking. See Form and Substance, supra note 52, at
1700.
111. See Singer, supra note 6, at 17.
112. Joseph Singer cites the example of trespass. No matter how clear we make the rules of
trespass, the availability of a vague public policy exception means that a judge can always use the
public policy exception to justify any particular case of trespass. See id. at 17-18.
113. See id. at 14-19; see also Form and Substance, supra note 52, at 1700 (existence of rules
and counterrules applicable to identical situations allow judges to manipulate results).
114. See Form and Substance, supra note 52, at 1700.
115. See id.
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nate.1 16 According to Professor Gary Peller, rather than being an
intrinsically significant age, the age of thirty-five might have signified a
certain level of maturity to the Framers.117 If so, it is unclear whether
the equivalent level of maturity in our modem social universe is
attained at the same age. An earlier age might be appropriate if one
emphasizes the worldiness of our children in a mass media world, or a
later age may be more suitable given the relative lack of social respon-
sibility given to children today. The choice between these and other
possible functional interpretations of the constitutional text is
indeterminate. 118
Another argument that critical legal scholars often assert is that
legal doctrine is indeterminate because it is incoherent. Law can be
incoherent because it embodies circular or contradictory assumptions.
For example, in contract law, and elsewhere, law attempts to reconcile
the fundamentally contradictory principles of selfish individualism and
paternalistic altruism, or individual autonomy and social community,
but ultimately only repeats the contradiction in legal reasoning.19 If
laws are radically or even largely indeterminate, then they do not bind
the judge. If the law does not bind the judge, then a judge never
merely follows the law but always creates it. Rather than enforcing
the law, then, the judge is enforcing personal will and acting arbitrar-
ily. Law becomes unjustified coercion and no different from brute
force or naked power. The authority of law dissolves into the dictates
of a willful tyrant.12 0 Under the assumption of radical indeterminacy,
law and illegitimate power become inseparable.
3. Indeterminacy and the Need for Reconstruction
Some mainstream legal scholars charge that by rejecting both onto-
logical and epistemological foundationalism, critical legal studies
would require us to give up law altogether in favor of a utopia where
116. See Peller, supra note 52, at 1174.
117. See id.
118. Opting for a literal interpretation is no solution to the indeterminacy problem since the
choice between "literal" or "functional" interpretation is also indeterminate. See id.
119. See Form and Substance, supra note 52; The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries,
supra note 52, at 211; see also MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987);
Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985);
Mark G. Kelman, Trashing 36 STAN. L. REv. 293 (1984). Critical legal scholars refer to the
exposure of the contingency of neutral, objective truths as "trashing." See Alan D. Freeman,
Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1229 (1981).
120. See, eg., Allan C. Hutchinson, Democracy and Determinacy: An Essay on Legal
Interpretation, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 541, 543 (1989) ("The indeterminacy critique is fatal to the
legitimacy of the current adjudicative enterprise ....").
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law is unnecessary.' 2 ' Others see a darker consequence. If we give up
law, we do not ascend to some utopia, but instead abandon ourselves
to anarchism and nihilism. In such a world, "anything goes"'122 and
brute force becomes the final arbiter of human affairs.1 23
Critical race scholars have also derided "the Crits' positive aim...
to establish a Utopia in which true community would prevail."'124 For
example, Professor Richard Delgado censures critical legal scholars
for being too idealistic and "ethereal." Delgado and Professor
Kimberle Crenshaw argue that law, if allowed to serve purely
majoritarian goals, may oppress minorities, but minorities have also
achieved tangible benefits from law.'12  "A court order directing a
housing authority to disburse funds for heating in subsidized housing
may postpone the revolution .... In the meantime, the order keeps a
number of poor families warm." 1 26 Critical legal scholars are "conde-
scending and misguided"' 127 and "[i]t smacks of paternalism to assert
that the possibility of revolution later outweighs the certainty of heat
now."
1
'
28
121. See, e.g., Phillip E. Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to Be Radical?, 36 STAN. L. REv.
247, 249 (1984) (critical legal studies leads to a form of "mystical utopianism"); Louis B.
Schwartz, With Gun and Camera Through Darkest CLS-Land, 36 STAN. L. REV. 413, 426
(1984) (critical legal studies is a form of "utopianism" that imagines an "impossible Eden").
Indeed, many critical pragmatists seem to have their moments when they dream of a utopia
where law is unnecessary. See Singer, supra note 6, at 65 (suggesting that in place of law, we have
conversations with each other); Voices of America, supra note 55, at 1333, 1403 ("I conclude
with my personal utopian vision, which I believe is also an American utopian vision" and
suggesting that by "dismantling the false hierarchies that place one culture over another, it may
come to pass that we live together in celebration and peace.").
122. For a further description of nihilism, see Chow, supra note 6, at 234-35, 284-87.
123. See, eg., Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. Rav. 1, 16 (1986)
(critical legal studies spells "the death of the law, as we have known it throughout history, and as
we have come to admire it"). One response of the legal academy, then, is to shun the critical
legal scholars by banishing them from the legal academy. See, eg., Paul D. Carrington, Of Law
and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUc. 222, 227 (1984); see also Johnson, supra note 121, at 248 ("If
this is all the Critical scholars have to say, why should we bother reading them?"); Schwartz,
supra note 121, at 413-15 (critical legal studies cannot be taken seriously). But see Mark
Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515, 1519 (1991):
Law faculties believe that it is generally a good thing to have one (but not more than one) cls
advocate in the building . . . . One reason for this degree of acceptance lies in the
hierarchical politics of the legal academy. There are now enough cis people at leading law
schools that some of the authority flowing from hierarchy has attached to cls work.
124. Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What
Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 301, 312 (1987); see also Crenshaw, supra note
55, at 1356.
125. See Crenshaw, supra note 55, at 1356-57; Delgado, supra note 124, at 305-06.
126. See Delgado, supra note 124, at 307-08.
127. Id. at 305.
128. Id. at 308.
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Delgado would enthusiastically embrace certain rules, bureaucra-
cies, and other formal, highly structured, rule-bound environments as
useful deterrents against racism. 129 He distrusts informal, "structure-
less processes [that] affirmatively increase the likelihood of preju-
dice." 130 Crenshaw has noted that the civil rights movement has
achieved reforms eliminating most formal public barriers and public
symbols of subordination, providing real, if only partial, relief to
minorities. 3 ' Similarly, some feminists have argued that law can
serve the interests of women.1 32 These critical pragmatists acknowl-
edge the need for legal reasoning, law, rules, and formal structures
after the first, negative phase of critical legal studies.1 33
IV. PRUDENTIALISM AND EPISTEMOLOGY WITHOUT
FOUNDATIONS
As we have seen, critical pragmatists reject the traditional view that
ontological foundations sustain the legitimacy of the law's coercive
power. Moreover, by rejecting epistemological foundationalism, some
critical pragmatists argue that even if there are objective norms, the
tools of legal reasoning are so flawed and manipulable that law is sim-
ply the exercise of arbitrary power. While the critique of both forms
of foundationalism seems penetrating and is supported by fundamental
developments in twentieth century intellectual thought, critical
pragmatists themselves acknowledge the need for an alternative
account of law to replace the traditional model. If we want to give up
on foundationalism without giving up on law, what do we do next?
I turn now to the pragmatists' reconstruction of an alternative
model of law without either epistemological or ontological founda-
tions. This part first examines the pragmatists' use of a coherentist
epistemology to restore determinacy to legal reasoning and textual
interpretation. I examine epistemology first because pragmatic nor-
129. Id. at 318; see also id. at 305:
Even if rights and rights-talk paralyze us .... might they not have a comparable effect on
public officials, such as the police? Rights do, at times, give pause to those who would
otherwise oppress us; without the law's sanction, these individuals would be more likely to
express racist sentiments on the job.
130. Id. at 315.
131. See Crenshaw, supra note 55, at 1377-78.
132. See, eg., Minow, supra note 64.
133. See Voices of America, supra note 55, at 1403 (calling for the "last reconstruction" of
law). One critical legal scholar has suggested that some versions of feminism and critical race
scholarship are particular forms of critical legal studies that will bear the critical enterprise into
the future. See Tushnet, supra note 123, at 1517-18 ("At present one might describe the political
location of critical legal studies as occupied by certain feminists ('fem-crits') [and] certain
theorists concerned with the role of race in law (critical race theorists) .... ").
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mative theory cannot be understood without first understanding the
prudentialists' new coherentist epistemology. In Part V, I suggest that
legal pragmatists use the approach developed in connection with legal
reasoning as the basis of a pragmatic, deontological approach to nor-
mative theory.
A. The Virtue of Prudence
While the rejection of a foundationalist epistemology led certain
critical pragmatists to extreme skepticism, others used the new coher-
entist epistemology to replicate the constraints placed on judges by
foundational epistemological theories without creating new founda-
tions. Under this approach, later adopted by Quine himself, pruden-
tialists emphasize that while a coherentist epistemology can lead to
skepticism, it also leads to a cautious respect for tradition, existing
social structures, and beliefs. 134
Virtue I is conservatism. In order to explain the happenings that we are
inventing it to explain, the hypothesis may have to conflict with some of
our previous beliefs; but the fewer the better. Acceptance of a hypothe-
sis is of course like acceptance of any belief in that it demands rejection
of whatever conflicts with it. The less rejection of prior beliefs required,
the more plausible the hypothesis--other things being equal. 135
An illustration of this approach as the basis of a philosophy of law is
provided by the work of Professor Anthony Kronman.13 6 Kronman
assails what he describes as rationalism, or what IE have been calling
foundationalism-the derivation of principles of justice or programs of
reform through reason and abstract philosophical reflection, untainted
by an appeal to facts. 137 The rationalist emphasis on abstract philo-
sophical reflection as the means for solving legal problems is the very
antithesis of prudence. 138 Prudence combines both an intellectual
134. QUINE, supra note 82, at 44 ("[O]ur natural tendancy [is] to disturb the system [of
beliefs] as little as possible .... "); see also id. at 46 (discussing conservatism as an element of
pragmatism).
135. QUINE & ULLIAN, supra note 90, at 66-67.
136. See Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J.
1567 (1985) [hereinafter Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence]; see also Anthony T.
Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 835 (1987) [hereinafter Living in the Law];
Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990) [hereinafter
Precedent and Tradition].
137. See Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, supra note 136, at 1570.
138. Id. (advocating an approach based on "good practical wisdom") (quoting ALEXANDER
M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 23 (1975)). Though Kronman's version of prudential
pragmatism draws upon the thought of Bickel and Edmund Burke, see Precedent and Tradition,
supra note 136, at 1047-64 (explaining Burke's traditionalism), prudentialism finds its ultimate
source in Aristotle. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. VI, chs. 5-11 (J.E.C Weldon
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capacity and a certain kind of character or temperament. 139 The intel-
lectual capacity associated with prudence is the capacity to discern the
complexity of the existing human and institutional setting and to
devise successful strategies to advance favored principles. 1" The tem-
peramental quality of prudence refers to the sense of respect, an atti-
tude of reverence or even "wonder," '14 1 for complex, historically
evolved institutions. Change should always occur within a framework
that emphasizes the value of existing institutions.142 The prudent per-
son exhibits a sense of modesty, even humility, when considering
reform and always adopts the cautious stance of gradual, incremental
reform in place of dramatic and radical changes.143 Sudden shifts in
frameworks, even when justified, are to be viewed with apprehensive
concern and only used as a means of last resort.144
The prudentialist respect for existing institutions is greatly deepened
by a sense of traditionalism. 145  Kronman finds contemporary
accounts of legal precedent to be inadequate because they all assume a
timeless point of view and argue that precedent should be followed
only if it satisfies some instrumental end, such as utilitarianism, or a
deontological principle such as equality. 146 Instead, he seeks to expli-
cate the notion that we should honor the past, within limits, for its
own sake.147
Drawing upon the work of Edmund Burke, Kronman explains that
as human beings, we are biological creatures who share a common
trans., 1920) (Aristotelian concept of pronesis explains that knowledge of concepts is gained
through application not through abstract inquiry); Conventionalism, supra note 101, at 346.
139. See Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, supra note 136, at 1569.
140. See id.
141. Id. (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, REFORM AND CONTiNurrY 2 (1971)).
142. See id. at 1609-10.
143. Kronman draws this lesson from Alexander Bickel. See id. at 1609.
144. See id. at 1610; see also QUINE & ULLIAN, supra note 90, at 66-68 (even where the truth
is radically remote from our present system of beliefs, prudence and sound judgment counsel a
long series of short conservative steps, adjusting our system of beliefs incrementally, rather than
one rash leap, which poses the possibility of serious error).
145. See Precedent and Tradition, supra note 136, at 1047-68.
146. See id. at 1036-47. Contemporary accounts argue that following precedent is desirable
for utilitarian reasons because doing so increases the sum total of social welfare by enhancing the
law's predictability, conserving judicial resources, and increasing the prestige of legal institutions.
See id. at 1038-39. Following precedent also promotes the deontological principle of equality.
The judicial system should treat as alike two cases that are in all relevant respects comparable
except that one of the cases arises at a later point in time. See id. at 1039.
147. Id. at 1043. While all prudentialists may not share Kronman's view that the past desires
respect for its own sake, they do share a strong traditionalism. For example, a reverence for
tradition is displayed in the work of the philosopher Hans Gadamer, who has influenced
prudential pragmatism, see infra text accompanying notes 163-77, as well as in the opinions of
Justice Antonin Scalia, a prudentialist judge. See infra text accompanying note 192.
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metabolic world with all other creatures. Each generation of all crea-
tures, including human beings, duplicates exactly the biological cycle
of every other generation. Unlike all other creatures, however, human
beings also inherit a culture, a world of artifacts created by earlier
generations, which has outlasted its creators. This cultural world is
marked by two features: it is cumulative and, at the same time, perish-
able.148 Each generation accumulates and builds upon the culture that
it inherits. This cumulative feature allows humans beings to accom-
plish something unique among all creatures: projects that can span
many lifetimes, such as the cathedrals of medieval Europe.149 At the
same time, culture is also perishable, not only because we may inten-
tionally destroy it, but because if it is not purposefully maintained and
nurtured, it will eventually fall prey to neglect, decay, and ultimately
ruin. 150 Adopting an attitude of conservation or trusteeship toward
the past, then, is constitutive of our humanity in the first place.15
1
Kronman suggests that lawyers can assume the trusteeship of legal
culture through the development of prudence, the lawyer's supreme
virtue. Prudence can be achieved through the development of judg-
ment, a key but elusive concept, which refers to a combination of cer-
tain intellectual abilities and traits of character.152 The distinguished
lawyer, sought by clients and admired by peers, possesses more than
rote doctrinal knowledge and argumentative skill. 53 Rather, he or
she is recognized as a person of good judgment, the highest compli-
ment known to the practicing bar.1 54
Good judgment is not reducible to powers of deductive or analytic
reasoning so valued by the traditional model of law. Sound judgments
are neither derived from mechanical formulas nor the result of mathe-
matical proof. Rather, it is precisely those situations where the dic-
tates of deductive reasoning are counterpoised, where logical analysis
seems to pull in many directions or in no directicn at all, that judg-
ment comes into play.' 55 Yet, at the same time, judgment is also not a
species of intuition, which is non-reflective in nature and brings all
inquiry to a halt. 156 Instead, Kronman argues that judgment is a con-
junction of sympathy and detachment. In choosing between alterna-
148. See Precedent and Tradition, supra note 136, at 1051-54.
149. See id. at 1051-52.
150. See id. at 1052-53.
151. Id. at 1066.
152. See Living in the Law, supra note 136, at 847-61.
153. See ido at 861.
154. See id. at 862 n.44 (citing tributes to lawyers admired by the profession).
155. See id. at 848.
156. See id. at 849.
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tives, the person of good judgment takes an internal, sympathetic
perspective of what it would be like to live one's life according to one
of the posed alternatives. 157 At the same time, he also maintains a
certain detachment so as to be able to choose between alternatives.158
In other words, the truly wise counselor must be at once both compas-
sionate and objective.159
The concept of judgment may seem elusive and obscure, but this is
troubling only if we adhere to the foundationalist view of legal knowl-
edge and reasoning as primarily deductive and formalistic. Under the
traditional model of law, the exemplary practitioner is the lawyer who
has mastered existing doctrine and who possesses consummate com-
mand of the tools of logical argumentation as well as the mechanical
formulas for divining future judicial results. I believe, however, that
Kronman's account of judgment is best understood as the application
to legal theory of the conservative strand of the new coherentist episte-
mology, which views our existing legal knowledge as a web of beliefs.
What makes a counselor wise rather than merely clever is a sense of
which legal doctrines capture the sense of the enduring, underlying
values of the legal community as opposed to legal precedents or doc-
trines that the legal community seems ready to abandon. To return to
the web metaphor, the good lawyer will sense which legal doctrines
are relatively centrally located within the web and which doctrines,
once at the core, have gradually shifted to the web's periphery. In this
way, the prudent counselor will find the confluence between his cli-
ents' needs and the interests of the legal community. The wise judge
will reach decisions that gain the acceptance and respect of the bench
and bar. This cannot be accomplished by the use of abstract reason
alone. If anything, the formalistic, deductive reasoning extolled by the
traditional model may be insensitive to the complexity and balance of
the existing web of beliefs and may dictate results that ride roughshod
over principles and institutions that have been honed by human
experience.
Good judgment may be the wise counselor's most salient virtue, but,
as Kronman acknowledges, good judgment in law is no different from
judgment developed and used in other professions or even outside the
arena of work in personal relations."6 In this sense, Kronman's
157. See id. at 851-52.
158. See id. at 852-53.
159. See id. at 866.
160. See id. at 863 ("There are . .. fields of endeavor other than the law in which good
judgment is required and that tend, in turn, to foster it. There are also many people who learn
good judgment outside the arena of work .... "). Law, however, depends more on good
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account of prudential pragmatism shares with critical pragmatism the
basic tenet of the new pragmatic epistemology that rejects a rigid
demarcation between law and legal reasoning and all other branches of
knowledge. Rather than viewing the contingency and contextuality of
law as delegitimating factors, then, Kronman views them as virtues of
the law. Law becomes the supreme achievement of society and pru-
dent lawyers become society's invaluable counselors.
B. Prudentialism as a Method of Legal Reasoning
The shift to a coherentist epistemology marks a shift from the tradi-
tional model of law articulated in Part I of this Article to a pragmatic
model. In the sections that follow, I illustrate a pragmatic approach
to legal reasoning and textual and statutory interpretation.
L Logical Argumentation
The shift to a coherentist epistemology has significant ramifications
for legal method. It results in a shift from the traditional emphasis on
a deductive, syllogistic process to a process that emphasizes coherence
with a web of beliefs. This shift in method may have contributed to a
perception that pragmatism is an anti-intellectual, ad hoc, instrumen-
talist approach to law. To the extent that pragmatism emphasizes
using arguments based upon weight rather than logical necessity,
pragmatism is at odds with traditional views of legal reasoning and
does resemble the type of informal approach that we often use in daily
life.
Legal pragmatism does not hold that logical, discursive reasoning is
no longer appropriate at all, but that it should no longer be considered
the exclusive paradigm of legal reasoning."' Under the new episte-
mology, legal reasoning does not necessarily have to proceed in a lin-
ear, discursive fashion like the links of a chain. Instead, legal
reasoning seeks a result that best coheres with an interpretive context.
The relevant important values and beliefs within that context severally
cooperate to support the result, not like the links of a chain, but like
judgment than some other endeavors and shows a special tendency to call it forth. See id.
Another pragmatist states:
[Kronman] does not show how any of these traits is special to law or helps to distinguish
legal reasoning from other practical reasoning. The traits he points to are as important in a
business man or politician as in a lawyer or judge .... [O]ne is left wondering what really
are the distinctive attributes of lawyers besides familiarity with legal materials.
Conventionalism, supra note 101, at 351-52.
161. Cf Posner, supra note 2, at 830-36 (suggesting that deductive, syllogistic reasoning is
still useful within an overall pragmatic approach to law).
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the legs of a chair.162 Illustrations of this approach, applicable to legal
reasoning in general, are provided by cases involving textual or statu-
tory interpretation.
2. Textual and Statutory Interpretation
Prudentialist scholars reject the foundationalist, archeological
approach to textual and statutory interpretation that formed part of
the traditional model of law in favor of non-foundationalist theories of
interpretation. One such hermeneutics, much admired by some
prudentialists, has been developed by a leading contemporary philoso-
pher, Hans Gadamer, in his major work, Truth and Method. 6
Gadamer acknowledges that interpretation is a creative process in
which the interpreter projects a meaning upon the text. t64 At this
point, Gadamer confronts the specter of subjectivism: if a reader
projects a meaning on the text, what distinguishes interpretation from
opportunistic exegesis and idiosyncratic fancy? Like Kronman,
Gadamer believes that historical tradition "represents [our] inheri-
tance"' 65 and is constitutive of our very identity. We project a future
on the basis of the situation that the past has created for us.
1 66
According to Gadamer, all readers approach a text with certain
"prejudices" or "pre-understandings" since we are "thrown" into a
given world full of history and tradition. The issues and concerns that
we bring to interpretation are not merely our own preoccupation, but
are those that have developed within the historical tradition to which
we belong.' 67 At the same time, the text itself is associated with a
certain set of historically generated assumptions.
The reader's context, consisting of his own pre-understandings and
the historical and interpretive context of the text, form "interpretive
horizons." The process of interpretation is a fusion of those hori-
162. See John Wisdom, Gods in LOGIC AND LANGUAGE, supra note 43, at 195 (in legal
reasoning, "the process of argument is not a chain of demonstrative reasoning. It is a presenting
and representing of those features of the case which severally co-operate in favor of the conclusion
.... The reasons are like the legs of a chair, not the links of a chain."); see also Farber &
Frickey, supra note 2, at 1637, 1640-42 (rejecting the tower building metaphor of
foundationalism in favor of identifying mutually reinforcing elements of a web of beliefs or values
in legal reasoning).
163. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G.
Marshall trans., 2d revised ed. 1991).
164. See id. at 267 ("A person who is trying to understand a text is always projecting. He
projects a meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning emerges."). See also
GEORGIA WARNKE, GADAMER: HERMENEUTICS, TRADITION AND REASON 74 (1987).
165. WARNKE, supra note 164, at 79; see GADAMER, supra note 163, at 265-307.
166. See WARNKE, supra note 164, at 39.
167. See id. at 78.
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zons. 16' By this, Gadamer means the integration of one's interpreta-
tion of the text with one's own circumstances. As a result, the original
meaning of the text cannot be differentiated from the meaning of the
text for oneself.'6 9 From this description, we can see that the process
of interpretation is historically conditioned, dynamic, dialectical and
interactive. For example, compare a current reader of Shakespeare
with a reader who was a contemporary of Shakespeare. 170 The current
reader has different pre-understandings, including different cultural
and intellectual interests. That reader may, for example, attempt a
Freudian analysis of Hamlet's relationship with his mother. At the
same time, the perspective or horizon of the text has also changed or
evolved through history. A sixteenth century reader of Shakespeare
might find diversion in the work of a struggling local playwright. A
current reader, at least initially, understands Shakespeare the way his
predecessors did, but also brings to the task of interpretation certain
assumptions that Shakespeare's work will deal with abiding human
problems and meet high standards of scholarly and aesthetic
excellence. 171
To avoid the danger of unmoored, free-wheeling subjective interpre-
tations by the interpreter, Gadamer insists on the use of traditions,
which limit the influence of both the interpreter's personal beliefs and
the interpretive context of the text. 172 Nevertheless, these traditions
do not compel complete closure of interpretation. Indeed, the inter-
preter's personal beliefs may so overwhelm the interpretive process as
to prove decisive. Gadamer responds to this objection by invoking the
"hermeneutic circle," the notion that the individual parts of the text
are part of an integral whole.'73 To avoid capricious interpretations,
the interpreter must accord the text a presumption that it forms a
unity, an internally consistent whole. The interpreter can use this pre-
sumption to test the adequacy of the initial projection.174 One must
accord the text an "anticipation of completeness," a presumption that
the text has something to teach us that includes a presumption in favor
of the truth of the text.' 75 The text is given a certain normative
168. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 609,
620 (1990) (A horizon is "the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a
particular vantage point.") (quoting GADAMER, supra note 163, at 332).
169. See WARNKE, supra note 164, at 69.
170. See id. at 78.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 80-81.
173. See GADAMER, supra note 163, at 291.
174. See WARNrKE, supra note 164, at 83.
175. See id. at 87.
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authority. Only by doing so can one test the adequacy of one's initial
projections about the text. 176 Although we accept the provisional
truth of any text, including a legal text, the way we interpret the text
for any particular situation or case necessarily concretizes and modi-
fies tradition in line with our circumstances. 177 Given these presump-
tions, the interpreter projects his meaning on the text and then adjusts
that projection to take into account the integrity of the text. Thus, for
example, an initial projection that a particular statute is remedial in
nature can be revised and rejected in light of a more advanced study of
the statute and the statutory scheme of which it is a part.
a. The Rejection of Foundationalist Approaches to Statutory
Interpretation
Like the critical pragmatists, prudentialist scholars explicitly reject
any form of foundationalism as a viable theory of statutory interpreta-
tion. Foundational theories are all variants of "originalism," the view
that statutory interpretation must proceed to recover some single
source embedded in the original statute itself.178 Current originalist
theories emphasize the primacy of the intentions of the drafters
("intentionalism"), the purpose of the statute ("purposivism"), and
the text of the statute ("textualism"). 179
In Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, "° Professors
William Eskridge and Philip Frickey deconstruct each of these
foundationalist theories in a manner resembling the approach of criti-
cal pragmatists. Intentionalism is based on the flawed assumption that
a large group of legislators has a single, discernible intent concerning
specific legislation. Recent studies of the legislative process indicate
that not only is such an intent often indeterminate, but it may well be
nonexistent."8 " Purposivism assumes that legislation is carefully
crafted by deliberate, thoughtful legislators to reach specific, purposive
results. Modem public choice scholarship indicates that legislation is
often the result of a potpourri of conflicting interests created by inter-
est group politics and reelection-minded politicians. 82 Finally, textu-
176. See id. at 86-87.
177. See GADAMER, supra note 163, at 307-41.
178. This term, and its variants mentioned in the text, can be traced to Paul Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204 (1980).
179. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 324-25 (1990).
180. Id. at 321; see also Farber & Frickey, supra note 2 (rejecting the use of foundationalism
as an adequate account of first amendment jurisprudence).
181. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 179, at 326-27.
182. See id. at 334-36.
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alism ignores the recent developments in philcsophy of language
indicating that there is no timeless, objective, correct interpretation of
a text.183 All forms of originalism are incoherent and indeterminate.
b. Dynamic Statutory Interpretation
In place of foundationalism, Eskridge and other prudentialist schol-
ars advocate a pragmatic or dynamic account of statutory interpreta-
tion based on a coherentist epistemology that draws heavily from
Gadamer's hermeneutics. 184  Dynamic statutory interpretation should
seek the result that best coheres with an existing "web of beliefs." That
"web" is a set of legal materials consisting of the text of the statute, its
history, and current policies and societal values.185 In order to curb
the dangers of unmoored, free-wheeling, and arbitrary interpretation,
Eskridge invokes Gadamer's view that tradition plays an important
role in constraining the interpreter's consideration of the statute's text
and history. 186 However, although the text of the statute and the
intent of the drafters are generally given primary importance, dra-
matic shifts in societal conditions and values may shift weight to cur-
rent values and policy. In a number of different contexts, these
scholars have argued that a dynamic approach offers a better descrip-
tive and normative account of the interpretation of legal texts. 187
These scholars emphasize that textual interpretation is not archeologi-
cal, deductive and formalistic like the links of a chain, but eclectic,
appealing simultaneously to a number of different values in a web of
183. See id at 340-43.
184. For representative works, see Eskridge, supra note 168; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479 (1987) [hereinafter Dynamic
Statutory Interpretation]; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 179.
185. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 179, at 348 ("The pragmatistic idea that captures
this concept is the "web of beliefs" metaphor. We all accept a number of different values and
propositions that, taken together, constitute a web of intertwined beliefs about, for example, the
role of statutes in our public law."); Farber & Frickey, supra note 2, at 1641 ("[W]e don't have a
tower of values, with free speech somewhere toward the middle, and more basic values
underneath. Instead, we have a web of values, collectively comprising our understanding of how
people should live."); Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 184, at 1483.
186. See Eskridge, supra note 168. Eskridge attempts to fashior a guide to the pragmatic
interpretation of statutes based upon Gadamer's hermeneutics. As an example, he argues how a
deportation statute applied in 1964 by the Immigration and Naturalization Service to deport a
Canadian citizen because he was gay might presently be interpreted to avoid such a result. See
Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967). Eskridge argues that the horizon of the statute has
evolved as a result of historical changes in social attitudes as well as the government's own
changes in policy and administration of the statute. See Eskridge, supra note 168, at 654-59.
187. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 2, at 1631-35 (arguing that the result in New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1976), best coheres with important societal values in free
speech). See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 179.
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beliefs.18 8  Recently, Judge Richard Posner has endorsed this prag-
matic approach to legal reasoning. 189
c. Judicial Assimilation of the New Pragmatic Epistemology as
Applied to Statutory Interpretation
A growing cadre of judges, led by Justice Antonin Scalia, seems to
subscribe to the conservative strand of the new pragmatic epistemol-
ogy, especially as applied to statutory interpretation. The following
section provides a brief sketch of the views of these judges. Although
it focuses on the views of Justice Scalia, 9 others, such as Judge Frank
Easterbrook, also share similar views.
. An Outline of Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence
Justice Scalia's jurisprudence seeks to constrain judicial discretion
to the greatest extent possible.19 Two features of his jurisprudence
serve to curtail judicial discretion: his emphasis on textual exegesis in
legal interpretation and his traditionalism.
188. Eskridge and Frickey believe that legal arguments resemble the threads of a cable rather
than the links of a chain. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 179, at 350-52.
189. See Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1653
(1990); POSNER, supra note 5, at 225-81; Posner, supra note 2. For representative cases, see, e.g.,
Forrester v. White, 792 F.2d 647, 658-59 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., dissenting) (dynamic
interpretation of § 1983), rev'd, 484 U.S. 219 (1988); United States v. Wolf, 787 F.2d 1094,
1100-01 (7th Cir. 1986) (dynamic interpretation of Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1982)). Judge
Posner has endorsed a model of imaginative reconstruction in which the interpreter seeks to
place himself in the minds of Congress and ask how Congress would have decided the particular
issue in dispute. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and the
Courtroom, 50 U. Cmi. L. REv. 800, 817-20 (1983). This is a form of dynamic statutory
interpretation.
190. Justice Scalia has been widely influential although he has been on the Supreme Court for
only a short period, and there is already extensive literature on his jurisprudence. See, eg.,
William N. Eskridge Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990); Daniel A. Farber
& Phillip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 423 (1988); Nicholas
S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of
Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REv. 1295 (1990); Symposium, The Jurisprudence of Justice
Antonin Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. RaV. 1583-1867 (1990). Justice Scalia draws admiration even
from those who find his views troublesome. See, eg., Eskridge, supra this note, at 690.
191. See, eg., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1988) (It is "dangerous to assume
that, even with the utmost self-discipline, judges can prevent the implications they see from
mirroring the policies they favor."); see also Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U.
CN. L. REv. 849, 863 (1989)("[T]he main danger in judicial interpretation of the Constitution-
or, for that matter, in judicial interpretation of any law-is that the judges will mistake their own
predilections for the law."); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CH]. L.
REv. 1175, 1180 (1989) (favoring rules over balancing tests because "[o]nly by announcing rules
do we hedge ourselves in").
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a. Textual Exegesis
Justice Scalia believes that the actual text of a statute, as opposed to
its legislative history, is the only legitimate source of statutory inter-
pretation.192 "[I]f the language of a statute is clear, that language
must be given effect-at least in the absence of a patent absurdity." 193
He states:
The meaning of terms on the statutebooks ought to be determined, not
on the basis of which meaning can be shown to have been understood by
a larger handful of the Members of Congress; but rather on the basis of
which meaning is (1) most in accord with context and ordinary usage,
and thus most likely to have been understood by the whole Congress
which voted on the words of the statute (not to mention the citizens
subject to it), and (2) most compatible with the surrounding body of law
into which the provision must be integrated-a compatibility which, by
a benign fiction, we assume Congress always has in mind. I would not
permit any... historical and legislative material... or all of it com-
bined, to lead me to a result different from the one that these factors
suggest. 194
Justice Scalia's approach is at odds with much current Supreme
Court practice. Under the traditional intentionalist approach, the
meaning of any statute is determined by the intentions of the legisla-
tive body. 195 The intent of the legislators is fixed as of the time the
statute was enacted and the goal of the interpreter is to recover that
buried meaning through the "archeological" approach of reconstruct-
192. See, eg., Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2369-76 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
West Virginia Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138, 1146-48 (1991); Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor
v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2487-91 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); Begier v. IRS, 110 S. Ct.
2258, 2269 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); Taylor v. U.S., 110 S. Ct. 2143, 2160-61 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., C9 S. Ct. 1981, 1994 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring); Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702, 2724 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2296 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Citicorp. Indus. Credit v. Brock, 107 S. Ct. 2694, 2702
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
193. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987).
194. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 109 S. Ct. 1981, 1994 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Because Justice Scalia's approach to statutory interpretation places primary emphasis on the text
of the statute, Professor William Eskridge has called this approach the "new textualism." See
Eskridge, supra note 190; see also Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New"
New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1597 (1991) [hereinafter Jstice Scalia's Textualism];
Zeppos, supra note 190; Professors Farber and Frickey were the first to spot Justice Scalia's
textualism. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 190.
195. See, e.g., Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. 1597 (1989);
Thompson v. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. 513 (1988); Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research
Group, 426 U.S. 1 (1976).
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ing legislative intent. '96 Although statutory language is strong evi-
dence of legislative intent, the actual intent may be beyond or behind
the statutory language and may be accessed through its legislative his-
tory.1 9 7 Under this approach, the Supreme Court often engages in
exhaustive review of legislative history even though the Court already
has found the statutory text to be clear. Occasionally, the Court will
use legislative history to trump a clear statutory text. 198
Justice Scalia rejects the archeological approach for a number of
reasons, including epistemological reasons that are anti-foundational-
ist. He notes that the intentionalists' use of legislative history
presumes the possibility of recovering a collective legislative intent.
This approach is flawed because the very concept that the entire body
of Congress with 535 members entertained a single collective intent is
incoherent. 199 Moreover, legislative intent is indeterminate. Even
assuming a collective legislative intent, it seems impossible to discern
this intent with any degree of reliability through the study of legisla-
tive history. Justice Scalia's views are forcefully presented in numer-
ous opinions.
For example, in Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier,2° the
Supreme Court held that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA")2° ' did not preempt state regulation of
pesticides. Perusing the statute's legislative history, the Court found
that because the two principal congressional committees responsible
for the bill disagreed over whether the FIFRA preempted the field,
pre-emption was not established by the clear and manifest intent of
Congress and therefore did not lie.202 Justice Scalia concurred in the
judgment, but argued that the structure of the statute and its text set-
tled the preemption issue. Examining the structure of the statute, Jus-
tice Scalia reasoned that if there were field preemption then the statute
196. See, Aleinikoff, supra note 32, at 21.
197. See id. at 22-23.
198. The classic example is Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459
(1892) (finding an exception based upon legislative history despite unequivocal statutory
language).
199. "That a majority of both houses of Congress... entertained any view with regard to
[interpretive] issues is utterly beyond belief. For a virtual certainty, the majority of Members
were blissfully unaware of the existence of the issue much less had any preference as to how it
should be resolved." Eskridge, supra note 190, at 652 n. 118 (quoting Antonin Scalia's speech on
use of legislative history); see also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. at 2296 ("It is [not]
our task ... to enter the minds of the Members of Congress-who need have nothing in mind in
order for their votes to be lawful and effective ... .
200. 111 S. Ct. 2476 (1991).
201. Pub. L. No. 92-516 § 2, 86 Stat. 975 (1972) (codified as amended 7 U.S.C. § 136).
202. See 111 S. Ct. at 2484.
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would not be understood as restricting certain state activities, but as
authorizing certain types of local regulation.2 "3 Justice Scalia would
have concluded all inquiry at this point without proceeding to pour
over the legislative history.
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia turned to an examination of legislative
history to illustrate his point about the dangers of its use as an inter-
pretive aid. Turning to the reports of the House Agriculture Commit-
tee and the Senate Agriculture Committee, he found that they both
clearly supported the conclusion that the FIFRA did preempt the
field.2"a The Senate Commerce Committee proposed an amendment
to the bill, giving local governments the authority to regulate pesti-
cides beyond state and federal requirements.20 5 The Senate Agricul-
ture Committee rejected this amendment. If anything, then, the
statute's legislative history supported a result opposite to that reached
by the majority.
According to Justice Scalia, all of this may be an indication of what
the committees thought, but it says nothing about what Congress as a
whole thought. It is unlikely that the members of Congress even read
the lengthy committee reports, totaling almost 20) pages, much less
pondered the specific issue of field preemption.2 "6 While there was at
least a vote in the Senate on the amendment by the Senate Commerce
Committee to permit local regulation, it is impossible to determine
why it was rejected. Senate members might have disagreed with the
Commerce Committee's proposed policy, might have thought the
amendment superfluous, might have been unaware of the whole dis-
pute, or three different minorities had each of these respective rea-
sons.20 7 What Congress as a whole may have intended
[w]e have no way of knowing; indeed, we have no way of knowing that
they had any rational motive at all. All we know for sure is that the full
Senate adopted the text that we have before us here, as did the full
House, pursuant to the procedures prescribed by the Constitution; and
that the text, having been transmitted to the President and approved by
him, again pursuant to the procedures prescribed by the Constitution,
became law.208
Justice Scalia also has argued that the primary materials of legisla-
tive intent often are unreliable evidence of congressional intent. Com-
203. See id. at 2488.
204. See id.
205. Id. at 2489 (quoting S. REP. No. 92-970, at 27).
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. Id.
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mittee reports only indicate at best the views of a few members of
Congress as opposed to the entire body.2" 9 Legislative materials often
are written by committee staff members, not legislators, and are rarely
read.210 Individual legislators or staff members may manipulate legis-
lative materials to accommodate lobbyists or interests groups by stra-
tegically planting directives on how certain issues are to be
interpreted, even when these groups have failed to gain a majority vote
on the issue.211 Statements made on the floor during debates are more
apt to represent the views of individual legislators, rather than the con-
sensus of the entire legislative body.21 2 Judicial use of legislative his-
tory will only encourage the bar to engage in a time consuming and
wasteful expenditure of resources.21 3 Recent public choice scholarship
in political science adds fresh support for this view.214 Justice Scalia
finds additional support for his rejection of legislative history in views
that he claims to derive from the Constitution. 215 When a court inter-
209. See id ("Assuming that all the members of the three committees in question... actually
adverted to the interpretive point at issue here-which is probably an unrealistic assumption-
and assuming further that they were in unanimous agreement on the point, they would still
represent less than two-fifths of the Senate, and less than one-tenth of the House. It is most
unlikely that many Members of either chamber read the pertinent portions of the Committee
Reports before voting on the bill .... "); see also Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 109 S. Ct.
1981, 1994 (1989) (no more than a handful of members of Congress could have been aware of
interpretive issue).
210. See Hirschey v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm., 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
211. See id
212. See id.
213. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 453 (1987) ("I am concerned that [the
Court's use of legislative history] will be interpreted to suggest that similarly exhaustive analyses
are generally appropriate (or, worse yet, required) in cases where the language of the enactment
at issue is clear.").
214. Justice Scalia's skepticism of the fiction of a single legislative intent is bolstered by recent
public choice theory, which casts into considerable doubt the accuracy of any prediction of how
legislators would have voted. Rather than rational and deliberate, the process of legislative
choice is seen as the unpredictable outcome of a potpourri of conflicting interests of lobbyists and
reelection minded politicians. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 190 (describing public choice
theory). Some scholars believe that public choice theory undermines the legal process school,
which emphasized a rational, deliberate purpose behind statutory enactments. See HENRY M.
HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKs, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIc PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAw 1414-15 (tentative ed. 1958) (unpublished materials). Professors Farber
and Frickey argue that the conclusions of public choice theory do not require that we completely
abandon legislative intent as an interpretive aid. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 190, at 430-35.
215. Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2490 (1991) ("IT]he full Senate
adopted the text that we have before us here, as did the full House, pursuant to the procedures
prescribed by the Constitution; and that text, having been transmitted to the President and
approved by him, again pursuant to the procedures prescribed by the Constitution, became
law."); see also Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92 (1988) ("Committee reports, floor
speeches, and even colloquies between Congressmen... are frail substitutes for a bicameral vote
upon the text of a law and its presentment to the President.").
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prets a duly enacted legislative text, rather than plumbing legislative
history, the court remains faithful to the bicameralism and present-
ment requirements of Article I of the Constitution.2"6 Moreover,
under a textualist approach, a court adheres to a constitutional princi-
ple of separation of powers, which forbids the judiciary from engaging
in lawmaking and thus usurping the legislative power entrusted to a
bicameral legislature and an executive oversee. Where judicial
inquiry is free to scour through a voluminous set of legislative materi-
als, the court will inevitably find some snippet to advance whatever
position it happens to advocate.217 The use of legislative history
greatly increases the likelihood that judges will substitute their own
views for those of the legislature, usurping legislative power and sub-
verting the democratic process.2" 8
b. Traditionalism
Justice Scalia's views on legal reasoning also are characterized by a
deep respect, even reverence, for traditionalism. Justice Scalia's tradi-
tionalism is most prominently displayed in the area of constitutional
adjudication, but, as we shall see, it is a underlying feature of his over-
all jurisprudence.
A good example is Burnham v. Superior Court.219 Burnham, a New
Jersey resident, was served with a divorce petition while briefly in Cal-
ifornia for a business trip and visit with his children, then living with
his estranged wife.22 He moved to quash the summons on the ground
that the California courts lacked personal jurisdiction over him
216. See U.S. CoNST. art. I.
217. See Begier v. IRS, 110 S. Ct. 2258, 2269 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the
majority opinion for "scouring the legislative history for some scrap that is on point (and
therefore ipso facto relevant, no matter how unlikely a source of congressional reliance or
attention)"); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory
Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 59, 62-65 (1988) (when courts move away from
statutory text, judicial discretion and hence judicial power is greatly increased).
218. See, eg., Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2376 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("When
we adopt a method that psychoanalyzes Congress rather than reads its laws, when we employ a
tinkerer's toolbox, we do great harm .... Our highest responsibility in the field of statutory
construction is to read the laws in a consistent way, giving Congress a sure means by which it
may work the people's will."). When Congress has created an executive agency and has
committed authority to the agency to resolve statutory ambiguities, the Supreme Court must
extend great deference to the decisions of the agency. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467
U.S. 837 (1984); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of LaK;
1989 DuKE L.J. 511, 516. For a discussion of constitutional problems associated with judicial
deference to administrative decisions, see Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: Restoring
the Balance of Powers in the Post-Chevron Era, 32 B.C. L. REv. 757 (1991).
219. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
220. Id at 2109.
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because he lacked "minimum contacts" with the state as required by
due process.221 Writing for a plurality, Justice Scalia examined the
practice of "tag" jurisdiction and concluded that such a procedure has
long been part of the traditions of American jurisdictional practice.222
He found that "[d]ecisions in the courts of many States in the 19th and
early 20th centuries held that personal service upon a physically pres-
ent defendant sufficed to confer jurisdiction, without regard to
whether the defendant was only briefly in the State or whether the
cause of action related to his activities there."223 Having found that
tag jurisdiction was consistent with tradition, Justice Scalia abruptly
ended all further judicial inquiry. He stated:
We have conducted no independent inquiry into the desirability or fair-
ness of the prevailing in-state service rule... ; for our purposes, its
validation is its pedigree, as the phrase "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice" makes clear .... Where ... a jurisdictional
principle is both firmly approved by tradition and still favored, it is
impossible to imagine what standard we could appeal for the judgment
that it is "no longer justified." [A] doctrine of personal jurisdiction that
dates back to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and is still
generally observed unquestionably meets the standard.224
Subsequently, Justice Scalia suggested that tradition has nearly dis-
positive weight in constitutional adjudication. In Schad v. Arizona, 2 25
a jury convicted Schad of first degree murder. Under Arizona crimi-
nal law, first degree murder was defined as either premeditated murder
or murder committed during a felony.226 Arizona did not consider
premeditation or the commission of a felony to be independent ele-
ments of first degree murder, but treated both as a means of satisfying
the requirement of mens rea. Thus, the jury instruction did not
require the jury to agree on whether Schad committed premeditated
murder or felony murder, but allowed the jury to find that he commit-
ted either offense. Schad complained that it was possible that only six
jurors believed that he intended to kill and six believed that he was
221. See id.
222. See id. at 2109-13.
223. Id. at 2111.
224. Id. at 2116-17; see also Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2748 (1990)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[A] venerable and accepted tradition is not to be laid on the examining
table and scrutinized for its conformity to some abstract principle... devised by this Court. To
the contrary, such traditions are themselves the stuff out of which the Court's principles are to be
formed.").
225. 111 S. Ct. 2491 (1991).
226. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-452 (Supp. 1973).
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participating in a robbery.227 He argued that procedural due process
required a unanimous jury verdict on one of the alternative theories of
first degree murder.
In a plurality opinion, Justice Souter reasoned that the defendant's
ultimate complaint was that premeditated murder and felony murder
were two separate crimes and not alternative elements of the single
crime of first degree murder.228 The Court, then, had to consider the
scope of due process limits on the authority of a state to define crimi-
nal conduct.229 The plurality first found that Arizona's approach was
consistent with a long tradition of state court practice.230 This tradi-
tion was strong evidence that this practice comported with procedural
due process, but Justice Souter added "neither the antiquity of a prac-
tice nor the fact of steadfast legislative and judical adherence to it
through the centuries insulates it from constitutional attack. '23 1 Jus-
tice Souter then turned to a critical examination of whether the two
mental states involved were morally equivalent and concluded that
they were.232 In his concurrence, Justice Scalia argued that the plural-
ity should not have inquired into the fundamental fairness of the Ari-
zona statute.233 The Court should have halted all judicial inquiry after
identifying the state law tradition treating first degree murder as a sin-
gle offense:
It is precisely the historical practices that define what is "due [process.]"
"Fundamental fairness" analysis may appropriately be applied to depar-
tures from traditional American conceptions of due process; but when
judges test their individual notions of "fairness" against an American
tradition that is deep and broad and continuing, it is not the tradition
that is on trial, but the judges .... Unless we are here to invent a
Constitution rather than enforce one, it is impossible that a practice as
old as the common law and still in existence in the vast majority of
States does not provide that process which is "due." 234
In support of this approach, Justice Scalia explained, "I know of no
other way to formulate a constitutional jurisprudence that reflects, as
it should, the principles adhered to, over time, by the American peo-
227. See 111 S. Ct. 2491, 2506 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
228. Id. at 2496.
229. Id. at 2497.
230. See id. at 2502.
231. Id. at 2503 (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991)).
232. See id. at 2503-04.
233. See id. at 2506-07.
234. Id. at 2507.
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ple, rather than those favored by the personal... philosophical dispo-
sitions of a majority of this Court. 235
Justice Scalia set forth the limits of traditionalism in Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip.236 A jury found an insurance company
liable for fraud and awarded a number of policy holders punitive dam-
ages against the company. At issue before the Supreme Court was
whether the award of punitive damages violated due process. The
majority opinion found no due process violation for two reasons.
First, the Court found that awarding punitive damages has a long ped-
igree in the history of Anglo-American practice and had consistently
withstood due process attacks in both state and federal court.237 Nev-
ertheless, the Court continued, "This, however, is not the end of the
matter. It would be just as inappropriate to say that, because punitive
damages have been recognized for so long, their imposition is never
unconstitutional. '238 The Court then engaged in a critical examina-
tion of awarding punitive damages and found that it satisfied the "fun-
damental fairness" test of due process. 239
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia asserted that the long history and
tradition of awarding punitive damages was conclusive of the due pro-
cess issue. "[A] process that accords with such a tradition ... neces-
sarily constitutes 'due process'. ... Once the Court finds that a
challenged practice accords with tradition, the Court should find the
practice constitutional unless it is prohibited by the clear meaning of
textual provisions of the Constitution, such as the Bill of Rights, that
are "thought to have some counterhistorical content., 24 1 If a tradition
is not so prohibited, the Court should refuse to conduct an independ-
ent inquiry into the fairness or reasonableness of the practice.242
From Pacific Mutual Life and other cases243 emerges a general
approach to the role of tradition in informing the meaning of ambigu-
235. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2749 (1990).
236. 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991).
237. Id. at 1043.
238. Id.
239. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion found that fundamental fairness was satisfied
because the jury's discretion in awarding punitive damages was limited by (1) the guidance
provided to the jury by the court's jury instructions and (2) the availability of judicial review of
the damages award. See id. at 1043-46.
240. Id. at 1047.
241. Id. at 1054.
242. See id. at 1052. Unfortunately, according to Justice Scalia, the Court had recently
departed from a tradition and historically based analysis to a balancing test in which the Court
independently determines the fundamental fairness of a questioned practice. See id.
243. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party of IlI., 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990).
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ous constitutional text.2' In practice, this appeal to tradition results
in a two step inquiry. First, Justice Scalia would determine whether
the practice was consistent with tradition. In determining the relevant
tradition, Justice Scalia would "refer to the most specific level at
which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the
asserted right can be identified. ' 245 Then, Justice Scalia would deter-
mine whether any clear textual command of the Constitution prohib-
ited the tradition. If the answer is no, the challenged practice is
necessarily constitutional.24
6
From this brief sketch of Justice Scalia's jurisprudence, he emerges
as a prudentialist judge in the mold of Burke and Bickel. To complete
this sketch, I continue to examine his views in light of some recent
critiques suggesting that Justice Scalia's approach is a return to episte-
mological foundationalism.
d. Justice Scalia and Epistemological Foundationalism
Commentators acknowledge that Justice Scalia's rejection of the use
of legislative history is essentially an anti-foundationalist argument.
Nevertheless, they argue that his approach is simply another, albeit
more interesting, form of epistemological foundationalism. As we
shall see, however, this characterization of Justice Scalia's jurispru-
dence significantly underestimates its sophistication.
L Textualism s Objectivity
Commentators have challenged what they describe as the textual-
ists' foundationalist belief in meaning as "an object lurking in the text
waiting to be 'discovered' by the subject."247 Critics have argued that
244. See id. at 2748.
245. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989). In that case, Michael H.
attempted to establish his paternity of a child born to a woman married and living with another
man. His efforts were precluded by a California statute creating a presumption that a child born
to a wife living with her husband is a child of that marriage. This presumption was rebuttable,
but only by the husband or wife and then only in limited circumstances. The plaintiff raised a
due process challenge to the statute arguing that he had a protected liberty interest requiring an
evidentiary hearing. In his plurality opinion, Justice Scalia rejected that challenge. Justice Scalia
framed the issue at the narrowest "level of generality": is there a tradition of allowing adulterous
fathers paternity rights? Id. On the other hand, Justice Brennan framed the issue much more
broadly as "whether parenthood is an interest that historically has received our attention and
protection." Id. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
246. See 111 S. Ct. at 1047.
247. See Eskridge, supra note 190, at 691. Others have suggested that the new textualism is a
type of "foundational formalism," see Farber & Frickey, supra note 190, at 425, and that "one
fundamental flaw in the Scalia-Easterbrook conception is its assumption that statutes have a legal
meaning that exists before the process of statutory interpretation." Id. at 457; see also Eskridge,
supra note 168, at 638 (referring to Justice Scalia as one of the "apparently foundationalist
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textualism is based on the false hermeneutical assumption of a clear,
immutable text that has a single, neutral, objective meaning.2 48 In
practice, however, the disagreement among leading textualists them-
selves about the meaning of legal texts undermines their claim that
textualism eliminates judicial discretion.249 As an example, Professor
Nicolas Zeppos cites Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 250 in
which Justices Scalia and Kennedy,251 two leading textualists on the
Supreme Court, disagreed with Judge Easterbrook on the interpreta-
tion of a United States Code provision dealing with a basic matter of
appellate procedure.252 Critics contend that since the text alone can-
not resolve all the questions that a court must confront, the court
should seek interpretive aids, including legislative history.2 53
While textualists such as Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook
emphasize textual exegesis as the primary means of statutory interpre-
tation, they do not hold the view that there is an objective meaning
buried in the statute waiting to be recovered by the interpreter through
a process of scientific discovery. For example, Judge Easterbrook has
written, "[i]udges interpret words. And words do not bind the inter-
preters; rather the interpreters give meaning to the words ...
[W]ords are mere instruments for conveying thoughts to others. The
critical people are the users, not the writers, of words." 254 Justice
Scalia has noted that "[s]tatutory interpretation . .. is a holistic
endeavor.,255
theorists" and arguing that the new textualism does not "tell us all that is going on in statutory
interpretation" and does not "even [operate] as a serious constraint on the interpreter.").
248. See Zeppos, supra note 190, at 1323, 1329, 1360-61, 1373.
249. See id. at 1325-26.
250. 109 S. Ct. 2218 (1989).
251. Justice Kennedy seems to be an ally of Justice Scalia. See Public Citizen v. Dep't of
Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
252. The issue before the Seventh Circuit was whether a court had authority to dismiss a
party whose presence destroyed diversity jurisdiction. Judge Easterbrook found such authority
in 28 U.S.C. § 1653 (1988), which provides that "[d]efective allegations of jurisdiction may be
amended... in the trial or appellate courts." Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain R., 832
F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1987) (opinion by Easterbrook, J.). On rehearing en banc, the panel reversed,
854 F.2d 916 (7th Cir. 1988), but the panel was subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court.
See 109 S. Ct. 2218 (1989). The Supreme Court majority rejected Judge Easterbrook's reading of
§ 1653 but found authority for the power to dismiss in Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. While disagreeing with the Court's invocation of Rule 21, Justices Kennedy and
Scalia did agree with the majority's interpretation of § 1653. See id. at 2226-27 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.).
253. Zeppos, supra note 190, at 1330; see also Eskridge, supra note 190, at 682.
254. Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'y 87, 87 (1984).
255. United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988).
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If the text does not bind the interpreter, then are legal texts indeter-
minate and are judges free to interpret legal texts arbitrarily and
opportunistically? The textualists must give an account of significant
constraints on judicial interpretation of legal texts even if they aban-
don the positivist notion that meaning inheres in the foundation of the
text itself. At the same time, the textualists cannot attempt to restore
determinacy by invoking new foundations to replace the old. Other-
wise, the solution they propose would be no better than the problem
they attempt to remedy. As a result, they seek to restore determinacy
without the use of foundations at all.
The textualists seek to impose determinacy by requiring that legal
interpretations be consistent with a relatively narrow range of permis-
sible interpretations within a tightly circumscribed context of existing
legal materials. According to Justice Scalia, the method for determin-
ing meaning of a statute is:
[F]irst, find the ordinary meaning of the language in its textual context;
and second, using established cannons of construction, ask whether
there is any clear indication that some permissible meaning other than
the ordinary one applies. If not-and especially if a good reason for the
ordinary meaning appears plain-we apply the ordinary meaning.256
In determining the ordinary meaning of the text, a court is "to read
the words of the text as any ordinary Member of Congress would have
read them . . . and apply the meaning so determined. ' 257 Thus, in
interpreting a text, the court should apply accepted principles of gram-
mar, diction, syntax, usage and logic used at the time of the text's
enactment. Once the court arrives at an ordinary meaning under this
method, it then uses canons of statutory construction in order to see
whether the ordinary meaning should be altered. These canons of
statutory construction permit the court to adjust the ordinary meaning
of the statute against other provisions within the same statute or
against the structure of the statute as a whole.25 In addition, these
canons allow the court to integrate the meaning of the statute at hand
with other statutes subsequently enacted, thus acknowledging the pos-
sibility of dynamic statutory interpretation. 259 As Eskridge has noted,
"Justice Scalia's holistic approach opens the door for statutes to evolve
over time." 260
256. Chisholm v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2369 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
257. Id.
258. See 484 U.S. at 371.
259. See United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988).
260. Eskridge, supra note 190, at 668.
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Since textualism holds that the meaning of a statute is determined
by its coherence with a certain set of interpretive materials, it should
be clear that the textualists do not believe that they are excavating a
single objective meaning embedded in the text as their critics some-
times charge.26 1 Rather, the textualists fully understand that they are
constructing meaning in the very act of interpretation. Justice Scalia
simply disagrees about what is the relevant interpretive context and he
attempts to define the context as narrowly as possible to constrain
judicial discretion to the greatest extent possible.
Since statutory interpretation involves finding a coherence of mean-
ing with the other elements of the interpretive context, it should also
be clear the textualism cannot completely eliminate judicial discretion.
Textualism contemplates its limited use. Finding coherence between a
specific statutory text, the rest of the statute, and other related statutes
involves prudentialist judgment of the sort discussed by Professor
Kronman. 262 To be sure, the textualists emphasize judicial constraint,
but this does not mean that textualist judges, acting in good faith, can-
not disagree among themselves in certain eases263 or that such disa-
greement undermines the claim by textualism that it eliminates
judicial discretion. The textualists never made such a naive claim to
that impossible objectivity. Rather, they seek to constrain, not elimi-
nate, judicial discretion.264
ii. Nonneutrality
Critics of textualism have also charged that it champions a norma-
tive agenda even though it makes the claim, typical of foundationalist
theories, that it reaches neutral outcomes.265 These critics also some-
times charge that textualists' assumption of neutrality is based on the
naive foundationalist assumption that there is a cleavage between law
and politics. The textualists, however, have never attempted to claim
that their position does not prescribe a normative vision for our legal
system. Rather, they acknowledge openly that their position is nor-
mative, but they argue that they derive these norms ultimately from
261. See supra text accompanying notes 247-48.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 152-58.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 250-52.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 256-59.
265. See Zeppos, supra note 190, at 1331 ("[The textualist is being less than candid when he
claims that he is guided by neutral rules which are not designed to reach any particular
substantive outcomes."). Zeppos insists that the new textualism reflects a normative vision of
how government should operate and be structured. See Justice Scalia's Textualism, supra note
194, at 1636.
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the Constitution.266 Textualism acknowledges that normative ques-
tions and policy issues are an inevitable part of legal reasoning.
Indeed, the textualists' description of legal reasoning as arriving at the
ordinary meaning of language involves the use of judgment in a way
that does not appear different from the type of judgment used in other
fields or even in everyday life. The textualists have no inherent objec-
tion to policy or normative principles. What they object to is a judge's
use of norms or policies that are personal to the judge.
e. Justice Scalia and Prudentialism
Since Justice Scalia views statutory meaning as coherence with a
web of interpretive materials, one might wonder whether there are any
fundamental differences between his approach and the dynamic statu-
tory interpretation approach advocated by his critics. Justice Scalia
would give the interpreter the least possible play or discretion by limit-
ing the interpreter to a range of permissible interpretations that must
cohere with materials within a narrowly circumscribed context: the
particular text of the statute, other provisions of the same statute,
evolutive factors that can be tied directly to later enacted statutes and
relevant rules of language, grammar, and logic. Advocates of dynamic
statutory interpretation, such as Eskridge, would consider relevant all
that Justice Scalia would consider, but permit more play in interpreta-
tion by allowing the interpreter to consider an additional array of fac-
tors including legislative history, intervening factual developments,
and evolving social norms and public values.267 Eskridge argues that
Justice Scalia seeks only "horizontal coherence," coherence of the
text with other parts of the statute or other terms in similar statutes
and not "vertical coherence," coherence with legislative history, cur-
rent social norms and public values.268 Eskridge's dynamic approach
seeks both horizontal and vertical coherence.269
266. See infra text accompanying notes 219-35.
267. See Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 184, at 1548 (in construing Internal
Revenue Code provision conferring tax benefits on charitable institutions "current attitudes
about giving tax breaks to racially discriminatory institutions are decisively influenced by the
public deliberation... since Brown"); see also id. at 1483-84, 1520; Eskridge, supra note 168, at
653-55 (taking into account evolving medical, social, and religious attitudes toward
homosexuality in construing immigration statute provision requiring the exclusion of aliens
afflicted with "psychopathic personality").
268. Eskridge, supra note 190, at 655.
269. See Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 184, at 1484 (under a model of
dynamic statutory interpretation "when a clear text and supportive legislative history suggest the
same answer, they typically will control"); see also id. ("[T]he evolutive perspective [is] most
important when the statutory text is not clear.... In such cases, the pull of text and history will
be slight, and the interpreter will find current policies and societal conditions most important.").
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While Eskridge proposes a cautious model of statutory interpreta-
tion, Justice Scalia's model is still more cautious. To the extent that
Justice Scalia refuses to consider evolutive developments in social val-
ues and adheres steadfastly to existing legislation and linguistic rules,
his position is more formalistic than dynamic statutory interpretation.
There is, however, no fundamental difference between the epistemol-
ogy of Justice Scalia and that of these prudentialist scholars. Justice
Scalia and Eskridge agree that legal interpretation consists of a coher-
ence with an existing context of interpretive materials, but they disa-
gree about the scope of that context. Eskridge's critique is an effort to
expand Justice Scalia's permissible interpretive context; it is an intra-
mural skirmish between proponents who share the same fundamental
views about legal knowledge and interpretation.
I have not attempted a general defense of textualism, but only to
deflect the charge of foundationalism. Justice Scalia fully understands
pragmatism's insights and the new coherentist epistemology. His
views are better characterized as those of a prudentialist judge in the
mold of Burke and Bickel. Justice Scalia's views may have flaws, and
we shall see them presently, but one of them is not the naive sin of
epistemological foundationalism.
V. PRAGMATISM AND NORMATIVE LEGAL THEORY
The preceding part has set forth a pragmatic model of legal reason-
ing that attempts to restore determinacy to legal reasoning without
epistemological foundations. An account of legal reasoning, however,
is only one part of a model of law. If legal pragmatism is to provide a
viable alternative to the traditional model, legal pragmatists must also
reconstruct a normative account of law. The normative account
serves to explain the basis of our political and moral obligation to obey
law at the same time that it distinguishes the legitimate coercion of law
from arbitrary power. Under the traditional model, this normative
account was provided by ontological foundations for the extralegal or
suprapolitical norms of natural law and legal positivism underlying
the legal system. In a world without ontological foundations, what is
the basis of normative legal theory?
In this part, this Article turns to the question of pragmatic norma-
tive theory. I argue that the legal pragmatists have shifted from onto-
logical foundations to deontological arguments in support of
underlying norms. As we shall see, the deontological arguments used
by the pragmatists rely upon a method drawn from their pragmatic
epistemology. Although they now share a similar epistemology, what
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ultimately causes deep divisions between the critical and prudential
pragmatists are the conflicting background norms that each group
advocates for our legal system.
Finally, I suggest a normative approach that incorporates major ele-
ments of both critical and prudential pragmatism and attempts to
unify the two approaches. Under my approach, liberal traditions play
a significant part in the pragmatic model, but these traditions are lim-
ited by a recognition that pluralism is a permanent, expanding feature
of our society.
A. From Ontology to Deontology in Normative Theory
Under a foundationalist approach, the justification of legal norms
consisted in demonstrating that they were sustained by or embedded
in some external, ontological ground. Legal pragmatists use what I
shall refer to as a deontological approach.270 Pragmatism uses coher-
ence not only as a theory of truth about general, theoretical knowl-
edge, but also a criterion of "truth" in normative theory.
In normative theory, the pragmatist does not start from an empiri-
cal vacuum or from a purely theoretical, ahistorical point of view and
then seek to derive abstract, comprehensive principles of political jus-
tice, such as norms governing a legal system, for some ideal society.
Indeed, this type of rationalist approach would be the antithesis of a
pragmatic normative approach. Rather, as Kromnan and Gadamer
suggest, the pragmatist starts with our own situatedness in a context of
historical and social circumstances, with our inheritance of a certain
shared public social culture as well as a legal culture, rooted in princi-
ples of liberal democracy, that is over 200 years old.
The task for the pragmatist is to arrive at a set of norms for this
political and legal culture. The pragmatist should seek to describe a set
of norms that interprets or best captures our deep moral sense and
that best coheres with the history of our moral and legal experience.
Once the pragmatist identifies the deep features of our moral experi-
ence, the pragmatist should attempt to capture these features in a set
270. The term "deontological" is commonly used in contrast to "teleological," the view that a
norm is justified because it promotes or advances some favored objective. An example of a
teleological norm would be classical utilitarianism. In this Article, I contrast deontological
arguments with ontological arguments, which seek to compel or demand our acceptance of
norms based upon the ineluctable authority of ontology. Deontological arguments do not
compel or command our assent, but seek our commitment and allegiance by calling upon us to
reflect upon a set of norms. This is the sense of the usage of deontological in the text and it
follows the approach used by John Rawls in A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) and Ernest Weinreb
in NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 97-126 (1987).
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of normative principles that stakes its claim to our allegiance. The
pragmatist draws upon a store of certain fundamental intuitive ideas
and norms implicit or latent in the shared public social, political and
legal culture of a democratic society.271 The pull or moral persuasion
exerted by the proposed normative theory is not based upon the ine-
luctable force of logic or the incontestable authority of ontology, but
upon the theory's ability to win our commitment based upon its
account of the main features of our normative experience.272 The
foundationalist, at least at times, seems to demand or compel our
acceptance of normative principles. The pragmatist, to the contrary,
seeks, but can never demand, our respect, allegiance, and ultimately
our commitment based on a proposed theory that illuminates those
features that we recognize as essential to our moral sense and experi-
ence. Perhaps the grandest and most ambitious modem example of
this type of deontological approach was applied by John Rawls in A
Theory of Justice to the problem of distributive justice.273
To some extent, the approach suggested here is similar to that sug-
gested by Gadamer and much admired by prudentialists such as
Eskridge. Gadamer's concept of the "hermeneutic circle" is the
notion that the interpreter approaches a text by according the text a
certain normative authority, a presumption that it forms an internally
consistent whole.274 Given this presumption, the interpreter projects
his meaning onto the text and then adjusts that projection to take into
account the integrity of the text. In the context of normative theory,
we accord the "text" of our political and legal culture a certain norma-
tive authority and we derive an interpretation of this "text" which
consists of normative principles. If we apply these norms and find that
271. This is similar to the process of Kantian constructivism described by John Rawls, who
uses this process to arrive at his conception of justice as fairness in A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra
note 270.
272. Rawls argues that in a liberal democracy such as ours, any normative theory must have
the support of an overlapping consensus, the support of groups which may have conflicting or
even incommensurable views about the value and meaning of life. See John Rawls, The Domain
of the Political and Overlapping Consensus, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 233, 234-45 (1989) [hereinafter
The Domain of the Political]; John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1987) [hereinafter The Idea of An Overlapping Consensus].
273. As the text suggests, Rawls' theory ofjustice is not foundationalist at all. Rawls argues
that any theory of justice must capture those features of our moral experience that match our
considered judgments. See RAwLs, supra note 270, at 46-53. In his more recent works, Rawls
has suggested that the aim of justice as fairness, the basic conception of justice presented in A
THEORY OF JUSTICE is practical; it does not purport to rest on timeless metaphysical and
ontological premises about the self, but starts from within a political tradition of a constitutional
democracy. See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 223, 236 (1985); The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, supra note 272, at 7.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 173-76.
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they fail to account for some important feature or provisional fixed
points of our legal system, we then make an adjustment in the inter-
pretive norm itself or reject the norm entirely.275 For example, any
proposed set of norms that rejects Brown v. Board of Education and
extols Plessy v. Ferguson will be plainly unacceptable to us and we will
reject the norms rather than tamper with Brown and its legacy or res-
urrect Plessy. 276 This account views practical normative reasoning as
a dialectical process in which we derive norms and then test them
against the background of our moral and legal experience and make
adjustments where necessary.
Once we commit our allegiance to a set of norms, these norms serve
as a guide to our future conduct. In the context of the legal system,
these norms function as the background or interpretive norms for a
context of legal materials. Since coherence is the criterion of truth, we
seek the result in legal reasoning that best coheres with the back-
ground norms we have chosen. Legal reasoning in general, not just
statutory interpretation, should seek the result that best coheres with
the given norm. For example, Justice Scalia uses tradition as a norm of
constitutional interpretation and would uphold practices that are con-
sistent with tradition and not prohibited by a clear textual command
of the Constitution.
In identifying interpretive norms, some pragmatists will inevitably
emphasize certain features of our legal history and culture over others.
This choice of emphasis inevitably involves value judgments. 77 The
pragmatists' ability to gain wide allegiance for favored norms depends
on whether those norms achieve a coherence with important, deeply
held features of the web of legal culture. This approach to normative
theory recognizes that at some point we must inevitably commit our-
275. See RAWLS, supra note 279, at 48-51 (describing the concept of reflective equilibrium).
276. Justice Scalia recognizes that no legal theory that rejects Erown is acceptable. One
problem with Justice Scalia's argument that tradition should be the touchstone of constitutional
interpretation is that it seems Brown cannot be justified by this approach because Brown seems a
bold departure from tradition. Justice Scalia's response is that we should respect only traditions
not prohibited by the clear text of the Constitution and that Brown is explicitly compelled by the
clear text of the Constitution through the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment read in conjunction with the Thirteenth Amendment's abolition of slavery. See
Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2748 n.1 (1990). He also argues that even if
the text of the Constitution is not clear, there was no unchallenged tradition of slavery during the
nineteenth century. For a highly skeptical appraisal of such arguments, see Robert A. Burt,
Precedent and Authority in Antonin Scalia's Jurisprudence, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1685, 1696
(1991).
277. See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 158 (1990) (task of
identifying background interpretive norms for use in statutory interpretation will be highly value
laden).
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selves to value judgments. The pragmatist approaches a legal culture
that consists of, among other things, cases, statutes, and constitutions.
No doubt some of the proposed norms may be derived directly or pri-
marily from written materials. Examples of norms that are traceable
directly or indirectly to textual materials are principles of federalism,
political accountability, and the protection of disadvantaged groups.27 8
Nevertheless, at the meta-level of choosing interpretive norms with
which to approach this legal culture, the pragmatist must abandon all
hope of finding a textual basis for interpretive norms. Rather, these
norms must derive from the store of shared intuitive ideas in the polit-
ical, social and legal culture. No one, not even Justice Scalia, can
escape the need to make value choices at the meta-level of choosing
interpretive norms with which to approach law. Despite his assertions
to the contrary, Justice Scalia does not derive all of his interpretive
norms for the legal system directly or even indirectly from the Consti-
tution. For example, tradition becomes an interpretive norm that Jus-
tice Scalia uses as a criterion to decide cases. Justice Scalia may use
tradition to inform ambiguous constitutional text, but the Constitution
itself is silent on the role of tradition in adjudication and silent on the
role of tradition and respect for the past in general. Justice Scalia's use
of tradition is not derived from the text or even the structure of the
Constitution, but is formed at the prior, meta-level of the choice of
interpretive norms.2 79
This approach is enormously complex and perhaps no one can ever
hope to arrive at norms that comprehensively capture all of the salient
features of our moral and legal experience. This is perhaps one of
pragmatism's central lessons: we can never hope to achieve the iu-
sory perfection in normative theory promised by foundationalism. At
the same time, pragmatism urges us not to abandon ourselves to a
radical relativism or anarchism once the illusion of foundationalism is
exposed. Some value choices are better than others if the chosen ones
exert a stronger claim to our allegiance. This is true although no logi-
278. See id at 164-67; Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103
HARV. L. REv. 405, 468-73 (1989).
279. Some of Justice Scalia's non-textually based normative views on the Constitution can be
gleaned from Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser of Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. Rav. 849 (1989), and
in Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In Smith, the
petitioner, a Native American, argued that a state law outlawing the use of narcotics did not
apply to the use of small amounts of peyote in religious rites. Without considering history or
tradition at all, Justice Scalia upheld the local law. One commentator has accused of Justice
Scalia of interpreting traditions opportunistically in order to implement a substantive agenda that
is profoundly anti-egalitarian. See David A. Strauss, Tradition, Precedent, and Justice Scalia, 12
CARDOZO L. Rv. 1699, 1715 (1991).
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cally compelling or dispositive argument exists for the choice of one
norm as opposed to others. As the history and course of our experi-
ence changes, so too should these norms. Pragmatic normative theory
is evolutive. This account also rejects any rigid demarcations between
law and other aspects of our historical and social circumstances.
This account of pragmatic normative theory is not simply a descrip-
tive one but is intended to be prescriptive as well. In a post-founda-
tionalist world where the criterion of truth is coherence, normative
theory should seek those norms that best cohere with the "text" of our
experience, and we should commit ourselves to those norms. Never-
theless, I recognize that this approach will not appeal to all
pragmatists. To some extent, this account requi-es that normative
theory operate within the existing traditions of liberal democracy
because they form an integral part of the social and legal culture that
we inherit. Some critical pragmatists, particularly some critical legal
scholars, reject these traditions. I argue below, however, that a conflu-
ence of both critical and prudential pragmatists adopt this pragmatic,
deontological approach to normative legal theory.
B. A Taxonomy of Pragmatic Normative Theory
Although legal pragmatism signals a shift in the nature of argu-
ments given to support a given result, rule, or principle, this does not
necessarily mean that the substance of the rules or principles them-
selves change. Although ontological foundationalism has gradually
eroded, there continue to be advocates of natural law and legal positiv-
ism in a predominantly post-foundationalist legal world. Ronald
Dworkin, for example, is often described as an advocate of natural
law. And, as we shall see, some critical pragmatists also seem to
invoke natural law. In addition we shall see that Justice Scalia
strongly believes in legal positivism, although he does not subscribe to
ontological foundationalism.
Influential historical and current positions on legal norms can be
represented as follows:
Table 1
Account of Law Source of Legal Norms
Natural Law LegalPositiism
Foundationalist Locke, Jefferson Hobbes, Austin
Langdell
Pragmatist Delgado, Minow Scalia, Kronman
Matsuda Eskridge
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As we shall see below, what ultimately divides the critical
pragmatists and prudentialists are the conflicting norms favored by
each group.
1. Natural Law Without Nature
Modern legal pragmatists still adhere to a version of natural law,
but unlike the classical natural law theorists, pragmatists do not
invoke transcendental foundations. While Locke believed in a divine,
ontological basis for natural rights, critical pragmatists, such as Del-
gado and Matsuda, have argued that certain conditions of oppression
permit its victims to speak with privileged insight and special norma-
tive authority.280 The basis for the special moral prerogative of certain
voices in society is not grounded in a norm supplied by divine provi-
dence but instead is based upon a favored normative principle that
exposes the unfairness and injustice of a legal system that systemati-
cally masks the exclusion and oppression of certain minority
groups.2"' Critical pragmatists seem to advocate a strong normative
principle of individual autonomy that disfavors collective coercion of
any kind that lacks the full participation or input of all persons subject
to the law's coercive power.282
The distinctive feature of natural law is its claim that there are valid
extralegal norms to which positive law ought to conform.28 3 Just as
Locke and the drafters of the Constitution considered positive law that
did not embody natural law to be unjust, critical pragmatists reject
positive law that does not reflect the excluded voices or viewpoints of
minorities and women. Critical pragmatists, then, advocate a new
form of natural law, not based on ontological foundations, but based
upon deontological principles. Critical pragmatism advocates a form
of natural law without nature.284
I do not mean to suggest that all critical pragmatists reject all posi-
tive law and urge us to return to a state of nature, although some seem
to have taken this position in the past. Rather, most critical
280. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
281. The justification for this norm is not based on foundations, but on commitment and
passion. See Singer, supra note 6, at 52-53.
282. For a further discussion of this point, see Chow, supra note 6, at 296-97.
283. See WEINREB, supra note 12, at 109.
284. See id. at 97-126 (discussing natural law without nature). For more on the modem shift
of natural law away from nature, see Lloyd L. Weinreb, The Natural Law Tradition: Comments
on Finnis, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 501 (1986). The foremost contemporary account of natural law
without nature is contained in JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
For a discussion of Finnis, see WEINREB, supra note 12, at 108-17; see also RUSSELL
HITrINGER, A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW NATURAL LAW THEORY (1987).
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pragmatists, such as the critical race and feminists scholars, probably
adhere to a jurisprudence that combines elements of both natural law
and legal positivism. I have stressed here the natural law element of
the jurisprudence of the critical pragmatists to distinguish their posi-
tion from the strong legal positivism of prudentialists such as Justice
Scalia.
2. Legal Positivism Without Foundations
As a view that traces the legitimacy of social norms to their pedigree
in the traditions of the social community, prudentialism espouses a
form of legal positivism.285 Unlike Hobbes, however, the prudential-
ists do not believe that legal norms or rules issue from a sovereign
authorized by a divine source or law of nature. The prudentialists pro-
mote a new form of legal positivism without foundations.286
The prudentialists' respect for tradition is based on their view that
in a world without foundations, no other source can legitimate social
norms already given to us by wide public consent and intersubjective
agreement. For example,
Gadamer's thesis [is] ... since we are historically finite, since we have
no concept of rationality that is independent of the tradition to which
we belong and hence no universal norms and principles to which we can
appeal, we ought not even to attempt to overthrow the authority of that
tradition.2 87
Other prudentialist philosophers have argued that we cannot "step
outside our skins" 288 or traditions to judge those traditions because
our traditions define our very notions of what is rational and norma-
285. See supra text accompanying notes 219-35.
286. In THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961), H.L.A. Hart reformulated legal positivism into its
most powerful form. Classical forms of legal positivism suffered from several philosophical
flaws. Hobbes' version, for example, invoked a divine ordinance that authorized a sovereign to
issue binding commands. See supra text accompanying note 20. Austin's version of legal
positivism, in addition to also invoking ontological foundations, suffered from the additional
defect that Austin equated law with the power to sanction disobedience with sovereign
commands. Under Austin's version, law seemed indistinguishable from naked power or "a
gunman writ large." See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra this note, at 79-88. Hart
reformulated the Hobbesian and Austinian versions into the view that the basis of the coercive
power of law lies in a form of political justification. Laws are rules issuing from some sovereign
political source within a civil society. The substantive rules of law, such as criminal laws, are
primary rules. These primary rules are deemed legitimate unless they violate some secondary or
higher level rules, such as a constitution. See id. at 67.
287. WARNKE, supra note 164, at 136.
288. CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM, supra note 45, at xix.
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tive. They propose that we can have no concept of reason and norma-
tive authority outside of those we inherit.289
Justice Scalia adopts a similar position as applied to law. Like
Gadamer and Kronman, Justice Scalia believes that whatever norms
are embodied in traditions must be the authoritative social norms of
our society because they are the cumulative result of incremental and
experimental social practices that, over time, have gained widespread
social support.2 90 Given that the historical tradition of our legal sys-
tem is one of a constitutional liberal democracy, Justice Scalia adheres
firmly to a strong version of classical liberalism that emphasizes
majoritarian preferences over libertarian interests.2 91 He believes that
the individual is the best judge of his or her own best interest and the
best judge of the norms that should govern or guide social life.
Indeed, Justice Scalia is almost boastful that we should accept tradi-
tion on this basis without any need for further justification or analysis.
According to Justice Scalia, the norms embodied in existing social and
legal institutions have the authority of longstanding social endorse-
ment and should be considered authoritative. A judge should vindi-
cate tradition whenever possible and no judge should be allowed to
upset practices that embody these traditions unless authorized to do so
by an authoritative constitutional or legislative enactment.
C. Charting a Middle Course
In the previous sections, I have suggested that although critical and
prudential pragmatists share a similar approach to normative theory,
they adopt different normative principles because they highlight differ-
ent features of our moral and legal experience. Once these norms are
adopted, they become background or interpretive norms for legal rea-
soning, which seeks the results that best cohere with a given norm or
set of norms. Since they emphasize different norms, the critical and
prudential pragmatists will tend to reach different results even though
many adopt the same coherentist approach to legal reasoning and
interpretation.
Although the prudentialists favor a strong view of classical liber-
alism and a concomitant endorsement of the majoritarian traditions
that have the stamp of social consent and approval, critical
pragmatists view these traditions as oppressive to minorities and
289. See id at ix-xxviii; WARNKE, supra note 164, at 156.
290. See Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral
Convictions into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1504 (1989); see also West, supra note 50, at 653
(explaining positions of conservative constitutional thinkers).
291. For a discussion of classical liberalism, see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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would advocate forms of corrective justice to limit tradition.2 92 To
some extent, at least, the conflict between critical and prudential prag-
matism is a form of one of the basic, seemingly most unresolvable
dilemmas of liberal democracy: to what extent can the libertarian
interests of minorities be protected from majoritarian traditions that
are oppressive? At this point, it might appear that we have reached an
uneasy and perhaps intractable stalemate. One might wonder whether
there is any principled way to resolve this dispute between the critical
pragmatists and the prudentialists. If the choice is among background
norms, how can we ever hope to justify one set of norms rather than
another?
Although pragmatism recognizes that knowledge, including legal
norms, are socially constructed, this does not mean that we have no
way of preferring some norms over others.293 In the section that fol-
lows, I suggest an approach to normative theory that will develop
some criteria by which we can compare background norms.
L Some Criteria for Evaluating Proposed Norms
As I have suggested, critical and prudential pragmatists actually
favor different normative principles, but both support their principles
through deontological arguments. Taking this approach, both the
critical pragmatists and the prudentialists argue that their favored nor-
mative principles emerge from an examination of relevant legal mater-
ials. Deontological arguments are persuasive to the extent that they
demonstrate that a favored normative principle best coheres with the
existing web of legal materials. Given that this is the approach taken
by both the critical and prudential pragmatists, I believe that the juris-
prudence that has the strongest claim to our allegiance and respect is
the one that consists of normative principles that coheres with as
much of the existing web of beliefs as possible, including the conflicts
and flaws within the legal system itself. A jurisprudential theory that
coheres with more of the legal system than a rival theory is a better
theory and desires more of our allegiance and respect. On the other
hand, a norm that fails to capture some deeply felt features of our
moral and legal experience deserves less of our respect and allegiance.
292. See supra text accompanying notes 55-76.
293. Professor Hilary Putnam makes a similar point in discussing metaphysical realism, the
view that there is some substratum of reality independent of human co.3nition. Even if we accept
the view that there is no realism in the strong sense of some bedrock external reality that,
through the test of correspondence, will confirm or infirm specific beliefs, this does not mean that
all beliefs are equally valid and that some beliefs are not better than others. See HILARY
PUTNAM, REALISM WITH A HUMAN FAcE 3-29 (1990); see also PUTNAM, supra note 42.
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The approach suggested here is similar, but not identical to, the
"law as integrity" approach developed by Ronald Dworkin. Accord-
ing to Dworkin's approach, "propositions of law are true if they figure
in or follow from the principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due
process that provide the best constructive interpretation of the com-
munity's legal practice."2 94 We are to view laws "on the assumption
that they were all created by a single author-the community personi-
fied-expressing a coherent conception of justice and fairness."295 The
law is an "unfolding political narrative," like a chain novel where the
authors of the novel-judges and lawyers-aim jointly to "make this
the best novel it can be construed as the work of a single author. 2 96
The approach suggested here differs from Dworkin's grand, majes-
tic approach that views the legal system as the product of a single
author. Instead, I take seriously the insight of the critical pragmatists
that the legal system often reflects a single authorship that purports to
speak for its entire constituency, but which actually masks the system-
atic exclusion of other points of view. Dworkin brusquely dismisses
critical scholarship as an embarrassing, even spectacular, failure.297 I
argue that an approach that combines tradition with the insights of the
critical pragmatists offers a more complete account of the legal system
than a single, romantic vision of the legal system.
In the discussion that follows, I suggest some problems with
prudentialism and why it is an incomplete approach, one that must be
limited or tempered by the insights of the critical pragmatists. In this
context, I suggest that the prudentialists' emphasis on tradition as a
constraint on legal reasoning fails to capture or cohere with some
essential, deeply felt features of the existing web of beliefs and the
social and political institutions that form our society.
2. Tradition and its Limits in a Pluralistic Society
Although any set of legal norms must accord weight to tradition, I
suggest that tradition itself must be limited by other, countervailing
features of our legal culture. Although we inherit and are conditioned
by tradition, this does not logically entail that we must uncritically
294. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 225 (1986) [hereinafter LAW'S EMPIRE].
Dworkin's account of law has been developed in a series of works and was already apparent in
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY. See DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 66 ("[A] principle is a principle of
law if it figures in the soundest theory of law that can be provided as a justification for the explicit
substantive and institutional rules of the jurisdiction in question.").
295. LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 294, at 225.
296. Id. at 225-29.
297. See id. at 271-75.
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accept whatever tradition dictates. The approach of some prudential-
ists, which accords near dispositive weight to traditions that do not
violate some authoritative textual command, is inconsistent with other
important features of our legal culture.
a. Tradition in a Pluralistic Culture
Adherence to a strong principle of traditionalism is inconsistent, or
at least in deep tension, with the fact of pluralism, a given, permanent
feature of democratic societies that will not soon disappear.298 Plural-
ism assumes that persons will have conflicting, even incommensurable,
conceptions of the meaning, value, and purpose of human life.299 A
strong principle of traditionalism favors a conception of culture that
may be more appropriate for a monolithic society with a homogeneous
culture, but seems problematic for a nation marked by an increasing
diversity of incommensurable doctrines of both we3tern and non-west-
ern religious, philosophical, and moral beliefs. Respect for tradition
for its own sake, even where it is not dogmatic or uncritical, may
impede the progressive development of a culturally diverse society by
clinging to a cultural past that did not value diversity.
b. Perpetuating a Repressive Past
Professor Kronman argues that we should respect, within limits, the
past for its own sake. We must respect the past "because the world of
culture that we inherit from it makes us who we are.""a In a pluralis-
tic society, the traditions of culture do not necessarily define the iden-
tities of everyone, especially those who have been ignored or oppressed
in the past or those who have only recently been admitted to a culture
with a long history and tradition. Although Kronman views a failure
to embrace an inherited culture as an act of impiety,30 1 certain histori-
cally disenfranchised groups do not commit an act of impiety if they
do not welcome the inheritance of a dominant culture that was histori-
cally unsympathetic to the diversity and pluralism represented by
their ancestors. Traditions may reflect the values of the politically
powerful who have engineered a private hierarchy that secures advan-
298. See The Domain of the Political, supra note 272, at 234-45; The Idea of an Overlapping
Consensus, supra note 272, at 4.
299. See The Idea of An Overlapping Consensus, supra note 272, at 4.
300. Precedent and Tradition, supra note 136, at 1066. Kronman does argue that respect for
the past does not need to become an apology for the status quo. Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of
Prudence, supra note 136, at 1608-12.
301. See Precedent and Tradition, supra note 136, at 1066.
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tages at the expense of the politically disempowered.3 °2 Groups who
did not contribute in any meaningful way to the creation of the domi-
nant culture can hardly feel reassured by a view that perpetuates and
finds intrinsic value in a past that contains oppressive and even brutal,
morally repugnant traditions such as racial discrimination and other
forms of intolerable behavior toward certain groups.
c. The Problem of Stability
In a pluralistic society, favoring tradition or a comprehensive, domi-
nant conception of political, social, and legal culture will eventually
involve the oppressive use of state power to maintain a single, compre-
hensive doctrine and overcome pluralism. 3 3 The prudentialists seem
to give little weight to or totally ignore the arguments of the critical
pragmatists. Prudentialist judges will continue faithfully to uphold
tradition in case after case even though the traditions of American
culture often ignored the interests of minority groups and others inter-
ests favored by the critical pragmatists. Each judicial decision favor-
ing tradition becomes a result that entitles its advocate to enforce its
dictates by invoking the coercive mechanism of the state. A judicial
decision favoring some dominant, comprehensive conception becomes
an endorsement of the use of oppressive state power to overcome plu-
ralism and diversity. At some point, the continued use of state power
to favor a single, dominant conception in light of an expanding plural-
ism consisting of intense, deeply felt conflicting conceptions, may risk
the stability of the legal system.3 4
d. The Problem of Social Change
The appeal to tradition also is itself inconsistent with a deeply
rooted liberal belief in self-determination and self-transformation.
Traditions are essentially backward-looking and do not accommodate
change easily or comfortably. Despite the prudentialists' arguments, it
seems difficult to understand how we can change the status quo when
we are encouraged to view existing institutions with a sense of rever-
ence and even "wonder., 3 5 A strong appeal to tradition is especially
302. See supra text accompanying notes 62-76.
303. See The Idea of An Overlapping Consensus, supra note 272, at 10.
304. Rawls believes that any political theory of justice needs to achieve an "overlapping
consensus" in order to maintain stability. An overlapping consensus for a political conception
exists when it gains the support of opposing religious, philosophical and moral doctrines likely to
thrive over generations in a constitutional democracy. See The Domain of the Political, supra
note 272, at 241; The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, supra note 272, at 5.
305. See Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, supra note 136, at 1569; see also supra
text accompanying notes 139-42.
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troublesome in light of dramatically changed circumstances and social
conditions. Indeed, limiting tradition may, under some circumstances,
lead to results that engender more coherence in the legal system. The
traditional interpretation of a statute enacted under different social
and political conditions may lead to results that are incoherent or irra-
tional in light of modem conditions.3 °6 Valuing the past for its own
sake may be a virtue under some conditions, but it can also become a
vice when it locks us into the past when we seek new directions for the
future.
The availability of the legislative process is not a complete response
to the problem of tradition. Some may argue that no judge can fail to
respect a practice or doctrine that has been socially endorsed by tradi-
tion and has not been altered by legislation. Yet some traditions sim-
ply seem to elude legislative amendment. For example, Professors
Crenshaw and Matsuda argue that the traditions of American culture
condition members of society to perceive Blacks and other minority
ethnic groups in pejorative, demeaning ways.30 7 Similarly, Professor
Minow argues that society is conditioned to view women only in com-
parison to a male norm.30 8 It seems difficult to envision how such
traditions can be altered through legislative means. Moreover, the
exclusion of groups from access to power is part of the process that led
to dominant conceptions in the first place. In a pluralistic society,
there will be intense, deeply felt beliefs by certain groups who do not
have ready access to power. Yet this does not make the imposition of
a dominant, comprehensive conception and the stifling of pluralism
any less problematic.
In true pragmatist fashion, I recognize that none of the observations
above can be considered as conclusive, dispositive arguments against
the prudentialists' strong adherence to tradition. On the other hand, if
the prudentialists' seek wide allegiance for their approach to legal the-
ory, they must recognize the need to temper an approach that is in
such deep tension, if not direct conflict, with other important features
of an increasingly pluralistic society.
306. See Sunstein, supra note 278, at 494.
307. See Crenshaw, supra note 55, at 1370-73 ("Throughout American history... various
political, scientific, and religious theories, each of which relies on racial characterizations and
stereotypes about Blacks... have coalesced into an extensive legitimating ideology" and have
depicted Blacks as lazy, unintelligent, shiftless, and lascivious.); Voices ofAmerica, supra note 55,
at 1375 (A "nationalist/monocultural" view that holds "people in a nation as radically diverse in
accents as ours to one standard of pronunciation is a declaration that this is a nation of one
voice... [T]he fiction of a generic American accent implies that this is a white, upper-class
nation, and all non-white, ethnic, regional, and lower-class accents are subnormal.").
308. See supra text accompanying notes 69-76.
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CONCLUSION
All of the modem legal pragmatists discussed in this Article reject
both ontological and epistemological foundationalism, essential fea-
tures of the traditional model of law. I have suggested that legal prag-
matism offers an alternative model of law that avoids the untenable
philosophical assumptions of the traditional model. The pragmatic
model of law contains two distinctive features: a pragmatic account of
legal reasoning and a pragmatic approach to normative theory. Most,
but not all, legal pragmatists today adopt some version of both
features.
Among the critical pragmatists, however, some critical legal schol-
ars reject not only the traditional model of law, but also seem to reject
both the normative and epistemological features of the pragmatic
model explained in this Article.3"9 Other critical legal scholars seem
to accept the pragmatic approach to normative theory, but reject the
pragmatic approach to legal reasoning advocated by the prudentialists
in Part IV above. Since both a normative account and an epistemolog-
ical account are necessary to sustain the legitimacy of law and since
some critical legal scholars reject the traditional model and also reject
one or both features of the alternative pragmatic model, it becomes
difficult to see how law is possible at all for some critical legal scholars.
On the other hand, at least some critical pragmatists, the critical
race scholars and critical feminists, seem to accept both the normative
and epistemological features of the pragmatic model. For example, at
the same time that Professor Delgado argues for the special preroga-
tive of the voice of color, he also maintains a staunch fidelity to the
results that are achieved by the application of certain favored positive
laws that inhibit discrimination against minorities.31 0 At the same
time, prudentialists, such as Justice Scalia and Professor Kronman,
seem to accept both features of the pragmatic model.
If this account of pragmatism is accurate, then modem legal
thought has reached a significant new stage in which opponents have
finally reached common ground concerning fundamental assumptions
or premises. There is a confluence between some critical pragmatists
and the prudentialists who now seem to share common fundamental
assumptions about the nature of normative theory and the nature of
legal knowledge and legal reasoning. The essential debate is no longer
at the intractable philosophical or metaphysical level concerning the
309. See, eg., Singer, supra note 6. For a further discussion of this point, see Chow, supra
note 6, at 255-58.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 125-30.
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nature of normative theory and legal knowledge. The debate is not
between legal pragmatists and some straw foundationalist, who seems
to represent no one with current views on jurisprudence. To a certain
extent, many or even most modem legal pragmatists seem to have
ascended to common ground concerning these fundamental questions.
Those who have not, some critical legal scholars, may soon be eclipsed
by those critical pragmatists who have.
Critical pragmatists, then, need no longer take aim at a foundation-
alism which maintains that law is grounded in external, transcendental
foundations and that legal interpretation is the excavation of an objec-
tive meaning from a determinate text. Yet, critical pragmatists con-
tinue to challenge mainstream legal thought as based upon a false
belief in foundationalism and do not seem to appreciate fully that they
face a new, more formidable opponent in the prudential pragmatists
who have articulated a profoundly conservative theory of law, but
without foundations." The prudentialists have already grasped the
basic insight of critical pragmatism that there are no external, tran-
scendental foundations that sustain law and have sought to take the
next step to justify norms and restore determinacy in legal reasoning,
but without the appeal to foundations. The prudentialist is a philo-
sophically more sophisticated opponent than the naive foundationalist
and shares common philosophical assumptions held by critical
pragmatists while using those assumptions to generate norms that sup-
port a profoundly conservative approach to law.
Modern legal pragmatists share similar, if not common, assump-
tions about the nature of legal reasoning and normative theory. What
ultimately divides modern legal pragmatists, then, is no longer an
intractable, abstract debate about fundamental assumptions or starting
points, but the differing background or interpretive norms that each
group favors. I do not suggest that the debate over norms can be
quickly or easily resolved. I do believe, however, that modern legal
pragmatists have at last reached common philosophical ground and
can finally move on to the next step concerning the substance of the
norms themselves. In this Article, I have attempted to suggest an
approach that might begin this debate by combining elements of the
normative vision of both of these groups. This approach charts a mid-
311. See, eg., Crenshaw, supra note 55, at 1351-52 (arguing that society has reified the
contingent assumptions and norms of the white majority and views them as natural, immutable
and clothed with an air of necessity); Johnson, supra note 55, at 2015 (arguing that mainstream
legal academics maintain that the standard of evaluation of scholarship is based on a "neutral,
objective, evaluative standard" and rejecting this as premised on a false foundationalist belief in
"certainty and objective truths").
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dle course that reflects the need to accommodate the tension between
respect for tradition and a recognition of a permanent, expanding
pluralism.
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